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The sprawling institutions of the U.N.1 are the major
sources of a modern international law. They generate a
bewildering variety of treaties which are opened for nation-states
to sign (although subsequent implementation and enforcement are
much more problematic), as well as create reams of international
“soft” and customary law.2 Founded sixty years ago, more or less,
and now facing mid-life crises, the U.N. sought to reform itself
through initiatives that responded to perceived crises. This process
came to a head at the September 2005 World Summit, and this
article seeks to explain why these initiatives largely failed, why
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1
See Roger Coate, U.N. World Summit Set to Begin, WASHINGTON
POST, Sept. 14, 2005, 2 PM (all POST articles read off
<WashingtonPost.com>. The U.N. is a “family” of intergovernmental
agencies: the International Labour Organisation, the World Bank, the
World Trade Organization, etc. etc. Reform must thus be seen as
systemic, “not just tinkering with things in New York.” Id.
2
Paul Brietzke, Insurgents in the ‘New’ International Law, 13 WIS.
INT. L. J. 1 (1995).
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international law thus remains mostly unchanged. A poker-like
model is adapted to explain U.N. processes.3 The 2005 reform
initiatives are then analyzed with the help of this model4, with
particular attention being paid to human rights (non-)reforms and
(the lack of) progress over implementing the Millennium
Development Goals.5 Assuming that this degree of reform failure
is undesirable, at least on balance, some remedies are then
discussed.6
Four interrelated definitions of international law will be
used in this article. Ideally, international law (and the other
functions of the U.N.) seeks to enhance security and a human
dignity/capability. Second, international law seeks to implement a
seeming paradox: global governance without a global government,
able to harmonize, integrate, and enforce laws and policies.7 Such
arrangements create what economists call “collective action
problems”8, and analogies to such arrangements can be seen in the
long history of Islamic or Judaic law and (by anthropologists)
3

See notes ___ and accompanying text, infra.
See notes ___ and accompanying text, infra.
5
See notes ___ and accompanying text, infra. I will follow precedent
set by Philip Alston _____________, and reproduce the Millennium
Development Goals in the Appendix.
6
See notes ____ and accompanying text, infra.
7
JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 21
(2002); Paul Brietzke, Globalization, Nationalism, & Human Rights, ___
U. FLA. J. INT. L. ___ (2006). See Tony Evans, International Human
Rights Law as Power/Knowledge, 22 H. RTS. Q. 1046, 1054 (2005)
(“discipline” as social organization without the need for coercion, “a
form of modernist power”); id. at 1065 (pessimists quote investment
banker Robert Hormats—the “great beauty of globalization is that no one
is in control.”). The argument at 1054 shows Evans is British, since it
was first used by the poet Mathew Arnold when he was also Headmaster
of Rugby School (where the sport of loosely-organized mayhem
originated). It later formed the ideology of British colonialism in Africa:
governance with the fewest resources possible, sometimes called Indirect
Rule.
8
Eric Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach (2005) (Olin
L. & Econ. Pap. 2d, No. 256 & SSRN 811554); John Yoo, Force rules:
U.N. Reform & Intervention (2005) (Berkeley Pub. L. & Res. Pap.)
(Both articles can be downloaded from <SSRN.com>).
4
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among indigenous groups who lack formal rulers and thus live by
reciprocal observances of rules.9 Third, while the profits from an
economic globalization can usually be appropriated by particular
corporations or countries, most of the rest of international law
seeks to create “public goods”: human rights, peace, development,
a healthy environment, etc. These goods belong to everyone, and
no one (other than an altruist) wants to bear the costs of pursuing
them; unlike profits from an economic globalization, they cannot
be appropriated for the pursuer’s sole benefit in the short run.
Another set of collective action problems, or “market failures”,
arise from the resulting under-supply of these public goods; none
but altruists will pursue them in the poker games to be described,
except when these public goods serve some other game purpose.
In other words, everyone wants to win even more by being a “free
rider”, who reaps good things paid for by others.10 Fourth,
international law provides the rules for the poker games that will
be described. These games are about access to, and a measure of
control over, an interchangeable wealth and power pursued
through legal (and other) processes.11
THE GAMES’ AFOOT
To paraphrase William Blake, I must either create my own
model or be dominated by someone else’s.12 However, the reader
is promised that taking the time to understand my poker model will
yield important insights not readily available in other ways.
Anyone who analyzes the international law produced by the U.N.
necessarily uses an explicit or implicit model, if only to tame the
intractability of the material. For example, two game theorists13
9

Brietzke, supra note 7.
Id.; Posner, supra note 8; Yoo, supra note 8. Posner, id., offers an
example: even if all countries would have been better off if genocide in
Rwanda has been stopped, each country would have been even better off
if other countries bore the considerable risks and costs of procuring this
stop. (This is like using other people’s money to play poker, while
keeping any winnings for yourself).
11
Brietzke, supra note 7, from which the model to be presented has
been adapted.
12
Regrettably, I have lost the source of this quote.
13
I.e., the American Thomas Schelling and the Israeli Robert Aumann.
See The Trade Game, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005 (all L.A. TIMES articles
10

[VOL. XX:XXX]

4
(NAME OF JOURNAL)

won the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics for modeling a relatively
well-known means of conflict management, which grew out of the
(bipolar, in both senses) Cold War. Inevitably under such models,
even sharp competitions must take place within a cooperative
framework, so that a game does not end in the violent conflict that
spawns international anarchy. Building trust and collaborations
through small compromises proves the most fruitful path, since
you can always punish uncooperative players (perceived defectors)
in subsequent rounds of play ("hands” of poker). 14 Briefing the
U.S. House International Relations Committee, Deputy Secretary
General Mark Malloch Brown argues that U.N. reform “has to be
the work of a coalition, and holding that coalition together is the
surest way to success.”15
Our topic—multidimensional and interrelated disputes and
needs, occurring in many geographic and subject matter areas at
the same time—is far too complex16 to be modeled as the twoperson, one-subject game described in the last paragraph.
Likewise, there are few “economies of scale in a [legal] rule
specific enough unambiguously to govern a decision; over time,
the increasingly-difficult question becomes which of these
proliferating specific rules resolves a particular dispute with some
degree of flexibility.”17 This complexity, and the uncertainty it
inevitably breeds, are not products of an international anarchy. A
are read off <LATimes.com>); War Games, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 15,
2005, 82.
14
Brietzke, supra note 7; The Trade Game, supra note 13 (modeling
the Doha round of WTO trade negotiations); War Games, supra note 13.
15
Mark M. Brown, Briefing to the House International Relations
Committee, Sept. 28, 2005 (transcript available at <unfoundation.org>.
16
Coate, supra note 1; Alberto Romulo, The United Nations and the
Building of a Better World, MANILA TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005 (Philippines
Foreign Affairs Secretary) (read off <manilatimes.net>). See MARK
TAYLOR, THE MANAGEMENT OF COMPLEXITY: EMERGING NETWORK
CULTURE 3 (2001) (we’re in an “era of unprecedented complexity, when
things are changing faster than our ability to comprehend them.”); id. at
13 (we are far from equilibrium, at the edge of chaos under complexity
theory; all significant change occurs in the area lying between too much
and too little order).
17
Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. INT’L
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more nuanced view of governance is required: a search for fairly
stable “rules of the road” rather than an automatic, Hobbesian18
recourse to coercion—which is usually too costly these days, for a
variety of reasons.
The need for cooperation and coordination during a
bargaining can often be met, even in the absence of a developed
global state, because the truly significant international “players”
are few in number. They are five in fact, and they constitute what
economists might call a “loose oligopoly”: the U.S., Russia, China,
the European Union, and the U.N. itself. (The latter two act as
major players only when members coordinate their
communications, power and resources effectively—something the
other majors can usually take for granted, although Congress
sometimes speaks in a different voice from that of the President for
example.) The very existence of the game (described infra) shows
that, unlike a globalized economy or science for example, politics
still recognizes and informally operates through nation-state
boundaries that define the “players”, through the sovereignty that
still proves both inevitable and necessary in international law and
relations. Thus the game fosters recognition that both the
successes and the failures of the U.N. and of its international law
are those of interacting nation-states. The game offers some
solutions to economists’ “collective action problems,” and to
dealing with “public goods” and “free rider” problems that are
stimulated by the existence of very high “transaction costs” in
L. 639, 641, 644 (1998); Werner Hirsch, Reducing Laws Uncertainly and
Complexity, U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1233 (1974). See MICHAEL KING &
CHRIS THORNHILL, NIKLAS LUHMANN’S THEORY OF POLITICS AND LAW
(discussing Luhmann’s analyses), id. at 285 (“awareness of complexity”
eclipses the claim that the problems of the world can be worked out
logically or even theoretically.”); id. at 286 (“the pressure for action
often cuts short the search for knowledge short.”); NIKLAS LUHMANN,
OBSERVATIONS ON MODERNITY 27, 67-68 (1998); Paul Blustein, U.S.
Free Trade Deals Include Few Muslim Countries, WASHINGTON POST,
Dec. 3, 2004, E1; Nobles & Schiff, supra note 8, at 50; Exclusive, THE
ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 2004, 78.
18
In the sense that Hobbes’ state of nature is sometimes evident in
global society. He assumed that we would agree to Leviathan under such
a SON, but global society is too complex and too democratic in parts for
such a consensus to emerge. See text accompanying notes ___, infra.
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international relations. The resulting outcomes are necessarily too
complex to be captured by simpler versions of economists’ game
theory.19
The global relations of the five major players play out
against a backdrop of what economists might call a “competitive
fringe”: the many countries that are too relatively poor and/or
powerless to effect outcomes much overall. Their role is usually
supportive of consensus among some or all of the five major
players. This tactic minimizes the antagonizing of major players
and perhaps provoking their retaliation, and it gives the minor
players a sense of inclusion in, and a “soft” power through,
international law and relations. Some of these many countries
have a situational or geographical power with regard to particular
issues, a power which forces the majors to take them into account
for some purposes: Saudi Arabia’s oil and its funding of Islamic
fundamentalism in many Muslim countries20 or India and Pakistan
in relation to Kashmir, for example.
A helpful extended analogy illustrating this small group
behavior has us imagining the five majors playing global poker
games.21 They have played together for so long that each is aware
19

Michael Glennon, Idealism That Won’t Work (2005) (SSRN Paper
No. ____); Douglas Snidal, Political Economy and International
Institutions, 16 INT’L REV. L. & EC. 121, 126-28 (1996). See THOMAS
JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON
TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 149, 156 (2000); Richard
Nobles & David Schiff, Introduction, in NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A
SOCIAL SYSTEM 1, 49 (2004) (discussing Luhmann’s ideas); notes 13-16
and accompanying text, supra.
20
Saudi Arabia was a good counter to Egypt’s Nasser and then
Saddam, and a surrogate after the Shah of Iran was overthrown. But the
U.S. inability to wean itself off cheap oil, and corrupting contacts
between U.S. and Saudi elites blinded the U.S. to the Saudi nurturing of
a militant anti-Westernism—including that of Al Qaeda, and the
alienation of its own subjects and freedom lovers generally. Milton
Viorst, Desert Storms, THE NATION, Sept. 26, 2005, 31.
21
See JAMES KOCH, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PRICES 268-69
(1974); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 165 (1970); supra note 108, at 268-69;
SCHERER, supra note 108, at 165; DAVID SKLANSKY, THE THEORY OF
POKER (4th ed. 2005); HOYLE’S RULES OF GAMES 241-79 (Albert
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of the past behavior patterns of the others, although the styles of
play from some new player-representatives—Bush/Bolton or
Putin, for example—can disrupt the game (infra). In particular,
each player has views about the strengths and weaknesses of its
own play, and especially about the reactions other players will
have to its own projected actions. Unlike chess, poker is played at
speed and player information is seriously incomplete. Players try
to fill informational gaps by evaluating opponents’ behavior, while
attempting to conceal the significance of their own behavior: in
other words, practising good diplomacy. (In contrast, Bush
telegraphs tactics in his speeches.)22 These anticipated reactions
affect the players’ actions in turn.
The barriers to becoming a major player are huge, which is
just the way incumbent major players want to keep it. Such
conditions hold sway even if other seats around the poker table (up
to a total of eight, say, although up to ten can play 5-card stud) are
filled by temporary players: e.g., Japan and North and South
Korea, but not the U.N. for the most part, during six-sided
negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. The range of
feasible outcomes from any given “hand” (round of play) is
reduced markedly by such particular players’ predilections, but the
actual outcome is still indeterminate because of unforeseen events
which are external to the game and because information is
imperfect: who has which cards (or which “hole” card(s), if “stud”
poker is being played) and how these cards will be played, for
example.

Morehead & Geoffrey Mott-Smith, eds., 3d., rev. ed. 2001). The ideal
analogy to oligopoly would: define the number of actors and account for
procedures, asymmetries (especially of information and a limited
understanding of political and economic forces), the ways expectations
are conveyed, an uncertainty of outcomes, and the managing of
cooperation. See JACKSON, supra note 17, at 18, 42, 156; Snidal, supra
note 19, at 123-24. The poker game analogy arguably satisfies these
criteria.
22
SKLANSKY, supra note 21, at 17, 245. See HOYLE’S, supra note 21,
at 267; Marking the Dealer’s Cards, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 2005, 92
(Friedrich Hayek saw the economy running on “dispersed bits of
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge” communicated to
everyone through shifts in market prices—or bets in the poker model).
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North Korea’s nukes offer a useful example here. While
Russia has been rather inactive, China has bet the most and has the
biggest stake in the matter—rivaling North Korea’s stake, even.
Resolving this dispute would greatly enhance Chinese prestige, by
helping to convert its growing economic power into a geopolitical
power. China has leverage, controlling 30% of North Korea’s food
and more than 70% of its fuel, but China also has the most to lose:
the collapse of the North Korean regime would flood China with
many stability-endangering refugees. South Korea’s style of play
has changed, from fear to an ambiguous pity for brethren who
could never be absorbed economically, through reunification. U.S.
game-play is difficult to evaluate. Like China (and Russia, infra),
North Korea threatens U.S. military dominance in the region, and
poses a diffuse threat to a valued ally, Japan (but probably not
South Korea), yet Japan seems only mildly concerned. Above all,
mutual incomprehension and translation difficulties plague the
course of play against each other by the U.S. and North Korea. It
is thus difficult to know the outcome from quite a few “hands”
(rounds of play): who won and lost what? Was some agreement
reached and, if so, what are its terms? Does it include a light-water
reactor for North Korea?23 Above all, have global concerns over a
nuclear proliferation gotten lost during the heat of play—perhaps
because U.N. involvement has been mostly limited to providing
food aid to North Korea?
Poker player-representatives are nation-state leaders or
their appointees, who thus play poker with others’ (taxpayers, etc.)
interchangeable wealth and power. Their style of play is thus less
cautious than it would be if players were investing their personal
23

Philip Bowring, Modeling Korean Unification, INT. HERALD TRIB.,
Sept. 27, 2005 (read off Internet); Joseph Kahn, North Korea Sets New
Demand for Ending Arms Program, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005 (all
TIMES articles are read off <NYTimes.com>. Glenn Kessler, What That
Accord Really Says, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 25, 2005, B2 (all POST
articles are read off <washingtonpost.com>); Tong Kim, You Say
Okjeryok, I Say Deterrent, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 25, 2005, B1;
Charles Krauthammer, China’s Moment, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 23,
2005, A23; The Deal That Wasn’t, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2005, 49;
North Korea Rejects UN Food Aid, Sept. 23, 2005, 2140 GMT (read off
<BBCNews.com>).
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wealth and power in the game. The playwright David Mamet
displays a deep understanding of poker while modeling
contemporary American politics.24 For Mamet, the only way to
win, to seize the initiative, is to “raise” (bet more than the other
players during the current betting round). But if you have never
raised before, the other players will simply “fold” (leave the game,
and leave you as the winner of relatively little; this is the tactic
today’s Democrats use in the U.S.). On the other hand, an excess
of your past raises in poker (a Bushian over-aggressiveness, for
example) makes the other players suspicious. One or several will
likely “call your bluff” by matching or raising your own raise(s),
thus forcing you to show your cards. But if you don’t raise, you
will “ante” your life away (pay the minimum necessary to play
each hand) and go home broke. Mamet concludes that there is no
certainty in poker, only likelihood, and “the likelihood is that
aggression will prevail.”25
Over time, the “luck of the draw” (the cards you get in a
particular hand) evens out, so success or failure turns on how well
you play all of the hands—or perhaps on how unobtrusively you
cheat; cheaters are shunned or worse, however. Players can set
their own ethical standards but, generally, anything short of
cheating—e.g., deviousness or deceit—is acceptable. Partnerships
among players are contrary to the spirit of the game yet (like
bidders’ rings at auctions) difficult to detect. The “cards speak for
themselves”, and players who have not dropped out must show
theirs—providing information on their style of play to the others.26
David Sklansky adds: “rarely if ever is a particular play always
right or always wrong. Your play is affected by the size of the pot
{the money-backed chips to be won, lying in the middle of the
table}, your position {whether you bet relatively early or relatively
late during a round}, the amount of money they have and you

24

See David Mamet, Poker Party, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005.
Id. But see also SKLANSKY, supra note 21, at 87, 121, 136 (a raise
should be a rare ploy to obtain information or when you expect greater
subsequent improvement in your hand than your opponents will have);
id. at 133 (“raising is often a better alternative than folding, with calling
the worst of the three.”)
26
Id. at 137; HOYLE’S, supra note 21, at 250, 266.
25
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have, the flow of the game, and other, more subtle factors.”27 A
simple game thus becomes quite complex when played by experts.
Consider a decision over “bluffing” (betting when you have no
chance to win if your bet is “called”) versus betting a fair hand for
value, where both plays may be appropriate and it is almost never
right to do neither. The decision turns on your view of your
opponents, and the self-image you want to project for the future:
you may want to be “caught” bluffing, to earn even more money
later on a good hand because opponents think you are bluffing
again. Those who never bluff or bluff too much become losers.28
As a poker player, the Bush Administration bluffs
excessively and in a particular way, by acting like a “plunger.”
With more wealth, military power, etc., than any other player, the
U.S. bets high at every opportunity, to drive opponents out of the
hand (force them to “fold” because they lack the wealth and power
consistently to challenge the U.S.), and perhaps out of the entire
game. The outcome, regardless of the cards the U.S. holds, is
more “pots” for it since some opponents with better cards will
“fold.” These pots are smaller, however, because some or many
potential bettors have been driven out earlier. Expert players with
adequate resources love a plunger like the U.S., relying on it to
subsidize their lifestyles: consider Israel and Egypt, reaping huge
foreign and especially military aid “pots,” even though they have
nowhere else to go or other viable modes of play. They even seem
to provoke additional bluffs from the U.S. (which they will
cheerfully “call”) by praising American sloppiness: betting heavily
on a dubious Mideast “democracy” while supporting autocrats, for
example.29 Unless the developing minor players are very skilled,
their play is often desperate, since they are playing with money
provided (under tight strictures) by the IMF, the World Bank, etc.

27

SKLANSKY, supra note 21, at 172-73.
Id. at 164, 173-76.
29
E.g., the November 2005 Forum for the Future in Bahrain, the
conference/centerpiece of Bush’s Middle Eastern democracy initiative,
collapsed over “Egypt’s insistence that Arab governments should have
more control over grants from a new {U.S.} fund designed to help local
pro-democracy groups.” William Fisher, Forum for the (Distant) Future,
IPS, Nov. 28, 2005.
28
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Some of this money originally comes from the U.S. which, in this
sense, is playing against itself.
In sum, the Bush Administration plays by a failed (perhaps
neoconservative or imperialist) formula, rather than adjust its play
according to who the relevant players are and the structure of the
particular game being played: e.g., the size of the ante and the
betting rules. In contrast, good players are intentionally
inconsistent—bluffing randomly and even seeming to blunder on
occasion, in ways which can often be assembled into a winning
strategy later. This is especially effective if it is combined with
disparaging, distracting, and/or confusing talk: consider Fisher
playing chess with Spassky or Khrushchev playing almost
anybody. If you are a good player, you know what your opponents
think your cards are, and what your opponents think you think their
cards are.30 The Bush Administration cannot be troubled with such
niceties of the game, or even with getting to know their opponents:
simply deem the North Koreans “inscrutable” for example, and
you will likely lose.
Analytically, the most important point is that the major
poker players recognize their interdependence, which makes the
course of play less fun but more predictable. Economists might
call the major players’ an “oligopolistic interdependence,” to
reflect the absence of consistent collusion among the majors. Each
major wants to “win” each hand for itself of course, perhaps with
each major defining what amounts to a win somewhat differently,
and each is keen to avoid the huge costs of monitoring the others’
opportunistic defections from a more formal “cartel.”
(Interdependence does not necessarily mean stability, in the sense
of an inherent tendency toward some equilibrium.)
But even more important than winning for the majors is to not lose
in certain ways: they seek “minimax” solutions while avoiding war
or some other painful (costly) disaster. Disastrous examples
would include the Zimmermann Telegram that helped to spur
World War I, and putative weapons of mass destruction (W.M.D.)
in 21st Century Iraq. Saddam offered a puzzle to the gamers, by
giving only the most grudging cooperation to U.N. weapons
30

See id. at 149; id. at 152 (“Many aggressive players … steal money
with bluffs”, etc. “but when they get a decent hand, they wind up
losing.”); id. at ____.
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inspectors when he had no W.M.D. Did he want to conceal the
humiliating fact that he had nothing to hide31—a hubris surpassing
even that of Zimbabwe’s Mugabe?
Players recognize that the safest way to avoid disaster
while playing to win is to play by “liberal internationalism” rules,
for want of a better description for ‘advanced poker’ or the antiHobbesian rules of the road. Ordinary poker is a zero-sum game,
winners benefit only at the expense of losers, while (an imaginary)
‘advanced poker’ is played in positive-sum ways: all or most major
and minor players benefiting from a particular game, through
cooperation and coordination. Over time, the players display an
enhanced trust, sense of injustice—particularly but not only as it
affects themselves, and even self-denial on occasion. This is
especially true when a public (“non-rival”) good can be won—
your use of it does not interfere with my use—and reaches a peak
over “network effects”: the more people who act in the same way
(use Microsoft Windows or act in accord with a particular law for
example), the more useful that good becomes for everyone.32
31

SKLANSKY, supra note 21, at 252, 257; War Games, supra note 13.
Posner, supra note 8, argues that “regional successes”—NATO, the EU
or NAFTA, for example—“are based either on the small number of
parties or the dominance of a few large parties.” Similarly, “the
dominance” of the major players helps explain poker outcomes, but an
oligopolistic interdependence among them does not consistently generate
the degree of consensus seen in Posner’s “successes.”
32
SCHERER, supra note 21, at 135, 166, 443; Snidal, supra note 19, at
122-23; The Concrete Savannah, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 2005,
Christmas Survey 9, at 10; The Economics of Sharing, THE ECONOMIST,
Feb. 5, 2004, 72. See KOCH, supra note 21, at 328 (in the course of play,
oligopolists “outline spheres of interest” which change over time);
ROGER MILLER, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS, (discussing George
Stigler’s implicit collusion among oligopolists, because explicit collusion
is too costly); id. at 352 (price wars as evidence of temporary disruption
of communication channels among oligopolists); JEFF PERLOFF AND
KLASS VANT VELD, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 175, 229n.,
816-17 (2d ed. 1994); SCHERER at 443 (recognition among oligopolists
that aggressive actions provoke aggressive reactions, which leads to
mutual restraint); Snidal, supra note 28, at 133 (need for cooperation and
coordination through bargaining internationally); Concrete Savannah, at
11 (“humans are hard-wired not for logic but for detecting injustice.”).
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While often-inconsistent or –incoherent rules emerge as a
side-effect of ordinary poker, a relatively integrated body of
international law can be built up through the group cooperation of
‘advanced poker’ over time. This is something no major player
can do by itself—through its domestic rules, for example.
Multinational corporations, and other nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) like Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and
al-Qaeda, (the Vikings of our time, alas), also play ‘advanced
poker’ at its fringes, strengthening global cooperation for their own
purposes. Even though processes may have a goal-orientation,
rounds (or hands) are usually played in cautious and incremental
ways. Effects are occasionally broad and deep over time, but
particular outcomes are more frequently halting and display some
or much backsliding by some or many players. Planning or
preventative action is usually impossible; you must play the cards
dealt you (in our analogy and in reality) under a short time horizon.
Cooperation is never perfect: mistakes happen; rebelliousness
occurs, especially among states taken for granted because of their
long record of cooperation; and major and minor States sometimes
prefer national interests (centrifugal aspirations) over a liberal
internationalist consensus.33

33

SCHERER, supra note 21, at 166; MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING
ABOUT WAR, 167, 170-81 (2004); Niall Ferguson, A World Without
Power, FOREIGN POLICY July/Aug. 2004, 23, at 38 (the “Vikings”
allusion); Walter Mead, Sticky Power, FOREIGN POLICY Mar./Apr. 2004,
46, at 51; Shawn Turnbull, Evergence of a Global Brain: For and From
World Governance (2005) (read off SSRN.com as no. 637401). See
JACKSON, supra note 2, at 33 (discussing the tendency to overlook
GATT obligations, especially when these are owed to the poor and
powerless); id. at 42 (perfection can’t be expected among players with
diverse interests); id. at 156 (the tactic of erecting barriers which cost
your opponents more than they do you); KOCH, supra note 108, at 350
(information about future states of the market isn’t free, and therefore
neither are decisions about what to do so that most simply follow the
behavior of the major players); Amman Says US Should Support
Millennium Development Goals, REUTERS, Sept. 5, 2004, 2136 GMT
(read off <alertnet.com>) (asked about U.S. Ambassador Bolton, Amman
stressed “give and take” or “in the end you can’t be effective”;
“consensus at all costs” creates “191 vetoes.”).
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A country can be called a “rogue” if it refuses to follow this
liberal internationalism consensus, over major issues and for
extended periods of time. If a rogue is relatively poor and
powerless, it is simply ignored: Zimbabwe for example—with
disastrous human rights consequences there. A more powerful
rogue gets disciplined by the majors if they can reach consensus
over how to do this: for example, a proto-nuclear Iran or a
chronically rights-abusing oil state like Sudan. Almost always, a
relatively poor and powerless state is best advised to play a
different game or by slightly different means to create a “niche”
for itself (clever advertising or a slightly different product are
examples drawn from the economics of oligopoly), which will be
tolerated by the major players because it does not disrupt their
overall games.34 Singapore, for example, has become much richer
and somewhat more powerful in quite specialized ways. Yet
Singapore is tolerated by the majors because, as a city-state, it
lacks the capacity to become a major player—a capacity possessed
by the India, Brazil, Indonesia, and even the Argentina and South
Africa that are thus watched carefully by the incumbent majors.
The game totters along, minor rogues notwithstanding, but
its continuance is threatened—as are the disasters that liberal
internationalism rules are designed to avoid—when a major player
becomes a rogue. After all, the last bout of globalization ended
when unresolved political tensions among the then-majors and
their satraps exploded into World War I. Even sophisticated
subsystems may be unable to block the causes of their own
destruction. The (Younger) Bush Administration arguably turned
the U.S. into a major-player rogue, by refusing to make important
game moves under liberal internationalism rules35 and thus
34

KOCH, supra note 21, at 350; SCHERER, supra note 21, at 10, 209;
Sebastian Mallaby, Making Globalization Work, WASHINGTON POST,
Feb. 28, 2004, A17. See SCHERER, at 209 (in an oligopolistic market,
limited deviations operate to inhibit retaliation).
35
E.g., the U.N. supported the U.S. in the Korean War, Iraqi War I
(1991), the re-installation of Aristide in Haiti (1994) and helped the U.S.
settle the Suez Crisis (1956) and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. Steven
Schlesinger, The U.N. Under Siege, Mar. 17, 2005 (Maximnews.com).
Bush the Younger thus came as a shock to foreign leaders familiar with
Bush the Elder’s and Clinton’s (admittedly rather tepid) liberal
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internationalism. Already in 2002, a career diplomat resigning over the
Younger’s foreign policies, John Brady Giesing, ably summarized the
changes taking place: “We are straining beyond its limits an international
system we built with such toil and treasure, a web of laws, treaties,
organizations, and shared values that sets limits to our foes far more
effectively than it ever constrained America’s ability to defend its
interests.” Paul Brietzke, September 11 and American Law
(forthcoming) [hereinafter September 11] (quoting Geising). In rapid
succession, the current Bush Administration repudiated the Kyoto Global
Warming Treaty, the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and U.S. participation in
the International Criminal Court; coercive ‘agreements’ were
subsequently wrung from a number of minor players, to keep U.S.
citizens out of this Court. The U.S. even managed to lose its perennial
seat on the U.N. Human Rights Commission, and the invasive U.S.A.
PATRIOT Act gave the U.S. a bad name among human rights advocates
because, e.g., it encouraged rights abusers. Common “anti-terrorism”
cause was made with dictators in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
more reliable allies in “old” Europe were ignored. Zbigniew Brzezinski
attributes such strange policies to a blind fear that periodically verges on
panic. Wright, infra note 102 (quoting Brzezinski). See AMY CHUA,
WORLD ON FIRE 8-9 (2003); Paul Brietzke, September 11; Ellen
Goodman, A Post-Bush Mind Set, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 30, 2004,
A19.
Having re-invented the doctrine of pre-emption as a kind of
anticipatory retaliation, Bush marketed Iraqi War II as if it were a soft
drink or toothpaste, adopting “Orwellian flourishes:” “in order to be
relevant,” the U.N. Security Council (that was awaiting reports on
weapons of mass destruction that turned out to not be in Iraq) “must
become irrelevant” by allowing “the U.S. to evaluate … risk and respond
in its sole discretion.” Michael Kinsley, By Whose Authority,
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 21, 2003, A37. See Guehenno, at 90; Lazare,
supra note 20-1, at 36.
Bush added fuel to foreigners’ fires over detention and torture at
Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib. Bush shocked even his cynical critics by
appointing (without Senate consent) the abrasive John Bolton as U.N.
Ambassador because, apparently, Secretary of State Rice did not want
him as her Deputy. Bolton is a darling of the neoconservatives who
would dissolve the U.N. or, at the least, force Kofi Annan’s resignation,
and whose influence over foreign policy is an increasingly permanent
factor in the U.S. Bolton led the U.S. repudiation of several treaties,
alienated North Korea (an easy thing to do, perhaps) and opposes EU
efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. He calls the U.N. a “rusting
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distorting the goal-orientation of governance without a
government. The U.S. uses radically offensive game-moves
(supra): Bush feels unable to wait until the next terrorist attack, for
example, so he is trying to change international law and politics
(ultimately the “game rules”) to enhance U.S. national security.
But Bush now tries to reach out to a world dismayed by the foreign
policy choices of his first term: in a conciliatory, more multilateral,
speech to the September 2005 U.N. World Summit, for example.
An inability to understand this global dismay is typified by
William Smullen: “It is clear that the American brand has been
badly damaged. {As if I’m selling toothpaste,} I’m not suggesting
we have to change our policy.”36 Earlier, the Security Council’s
“no” on supporting his Iraqi War II was a moment of defiance,
relevance, and global significance that soon collapsed nonetheless,
hulk”, opposes its peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, and denies
that the U.S. has a legal obligation to pay U.N. dues. Bush nominated
another neoconservative icon, Paul Wolfowitz, as the new World Bank
President. Diplomat and a senior Defense Department official,
Wolfowitz is a major architect of Iraqi War II. Glenn Kessler & Colum
Lynch, Critic of U.N. Named Envoy, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 8, 2005,
A1; Charles Lane, Mexicans on Death Row Get Hearings, WASHINGTON
POST, Mar. 8, 2005, A2; Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases,
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 10, 2005, A1; Colum Lynch, U.S. Drops
Abortion Issue at U.N. Conference, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 5, 2005,
A13; Brian McNamara, Letter to the Editor, WASHINGTON POST, Mar.
13, 2005, B6 (by a retired U.S. consular official); Susan Rice, Tough
Love or Tough Luck, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 8, 2005, A15; Ian
Williams, Real U.N. Reform, THE NATION, Dec. 27, 2004, 6; The View
From Abroad, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 19, 2005, 24 (a Special Report on
Anti-Americanism). But see Condi’s Challenge (“there are signs that the
administration is beginning to count the costs of its first-term policy.”).
Neoconservatives see Europeans as “a bunch of duplicitous, atheistic
wimps, whose moral laxity is leading them to an inevitable and richly
deserved doom.” The European Dreamers, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 18,
2004, 78. In sum, the Bush Administration continues to fuel nationalist
claims hostile to U.S. interests, and repudiates or ignores key
international law principles. But with some justification,
neoconservatives take credit for democracy in the Middle East.
36
Glenn Kessler & Robin Wright, Report: U.S. Image in Bad Shape—
Hughes Set to Begin Public Diplomacy, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 24,
2005, A16.
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under concentrated U.S. pressure. In sum, Bush’s bungling comes
close to Nixon’s 35 year-old nightmare, of turning the U.S. into a
“pitiful, helpless giant”—unable to subdue a rag-tag Iraqi
insurgency which has no major external sources of support.37
Intellectually-bankrupt tactics seem to involve driving lightlyarmored U.S. vehicles down Iraqi roads—to see who shoots or has
planted explosives.

37

Anatol Lieven, Liberal Hawk Down, THE NATION, Oct. 25, 2004, 29,
at 34. See European Dreamers, supra note 35 (the younger Bush
Administration is globally seen as having “feet of mud”, literally in New
Orleans and figuratively in the Iraqi quagmire); id. (quoting former
British Minister Clare Shore) (U.N. reforms are difficult when “the
world’s hegemonic power has set aside international law and declared
that it will act unilaterally whenever its interests are suited.”); Thalif
Deen, Despite Strictures, U.N. Chief Refuses to Yield, I.P.S., Sept. 14,
2005, 1511 GMT (all InterPress Service News Agency, IPS, dispatches
are read off <ips.com>); David Ignatius, They’re Not Going to Like Us,
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 23, 2005, A23 (wanting to be loved,
Americans assume our deep unpopularity is a “communications
problem” to be treated by e.g., appointing Karen Hughes or perhaps
sending more troops to Iraq); Glenn Kessler, This Year, Bush Takes a
Different Tone With the U.N., WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 15, 2005, A08;
U.N. Set Out to Institute Bold Reforms but Ended Up With Feeble
Tweaks, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 15, 2005, 8:07 PM (read off
<houstonchronicle.com>) (Bush’s conciliatory Sept. 2005 speech
contrasted sharply with his statement three years earlier, that the U.S.
would wage war in Iraq whether or not the Security Council approved).
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Putin’s Russia similarly tends toward a rogue state.38 His
purported emulation of Bush’s “democracy” and “rule of law” are
now muted by a desire to squeeze out any political opposition, to
claw back powers Yeltsin devolved to the regions, and to control
the media more tightly. The Economist sees traces of a Leninism
in this: “Russian foreign policy is still warped by the phantom pain
of its lost empire. The government still has too little regard for
private property, too often shows a reflexive distrust of business
{having repeatedly snubbed lax IMF and World Bank policies
concerning Russia}, and has an inflated idea of the state’s proper
role in the economy—as recent developments in Russia’s energy
sector demonstrate….”39

38

Outsiders understand little about Russia: e.g., having exaggerated the
extent to which Yeltsin established liberal democracy, they exaggerate
the extent of Putin’s backpeddling towards authoritarianism.
Admittedly, he has fought a brutal, human-rights-abusing war against
nationalists in Chechniya (a separatist province), justifying this as a
move against “terrorism”—the same justification Bush uses in Iraq.
Russia’s political meddling in Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Abkashia (a
province in Georgia), and Trans-Dniester (a separatist region of
Moldova) will almost certainly continue. But the ex-Soviet Muslim “stans” are slowly drifting out of the Russian orbit while adopting a
variety of anti-democratic practices, the Baltic countries are already in
NATO, and the Transcaucasian region is unstable and bloody—because
local rulers pursue ethnic nationalism claims. Rachel Denber, Beyond
Ukraine, THE INT. HERALD TRIB., Dec. 28, 2004 (reprinted at
<hrw.org/English/docs/2004.12/29/uzbeki
9941.htm>); Jackson Diehl, Russia’s Unchecked Ambitions,
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 8, 2004, A21; Peter Finn, Krygystan
Opposition Routed at Polls, Process Faulted, WASHINGTON POST, Mar.
15, 2005, A`7; Charles Krauthammer, Why Only in Ukraine?,
WASHINGTON PO ST, Dec. 3, 2004, A27; Michael McFaul, Reform and
Retreat, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 6, 2005, BW8; Bleak House, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2005, 80; An Empire’s Fraying Edge, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2005, 21; Vladimir III, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 11,
2004, 46.
39
Bury Lenin, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 2005, 12. See note 96, infra;
Jim Hoagland, Can Russia Stem This Tide?, WASHINGTON POST, Oct.
13, 2005, A23; Andrew Osborn & Anne Penketh, Putin Boasts of
Russian Power at E.U. Summit, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 5, 2005 (all
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Many E.U. and U.N. officials are appalled by U.S. and
Russian behavior, and a few commentators see Ukraine as the kick
off in a new Cold War.40 Many minor players are seeking cover
because they fear the onset of disasters and reallocations of power
that the disruptions in an ‘advanced poker’ game make more
likely. Such disruptions in a governance without government
game are also disruptions in relatively settled political and
economic expectations. Self-fulfilling prophecies of a lack of
cooperation can lead to a potentially dangerous level of instability,
and to even greater uncertainty and complexity. But the poker
games have been running within consensus borders since the end
INDEPENDENT articles read online at <Independent.com>); Beyond
Siberia, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2005, 45.
40
Outsiders understand little about Russia: e.g., having exaggerated the
extent to which Yeltsin established liberal democracy, they exaggerate
the extent of Putin’s backpeddling towards authoritarianism.
Admittedly, he has fought a brutal, human-rights-abusing war against
nationalists in Chechniya (a separatist province), justifying this as a
move against “terrorism”—the same justification Bush uses in Iraq.
Russia’s political meddling in Belorus, Georgia, Moldova, Abkashia (a
province in Georgia), and Trans-Dniester (a separatist region of
Moldova) will almost certainly continue. But the ex-Soviet Muslim “stans” are slowly drifting out of the Russian orbit while adopting a
variety of anti-democratic practices, the Baltic countries are already in
NATO, and the Transcaucasian region is unstable and bloody—because
local rulers pursue ethnic nationalism claims. Russia represses a militant
Islam in the Caucasus in coherent ways which alienate a hitherto
supportive population; Sharia is seen as a superior alternative to Russian
lawlessness. Rachel Denber, Beyond Ukraine, THE INT. HERALD TRIB.,
Dec. 28, 2004 (reprinted at
<hrw.org/English/docs/2004.12/29/uzbeki9941.htm>); Jackson Diehl,
Russia’s Unchecked Ambitions, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 8, 2004, A21;
Peter Finn, Krygystan Opposition Routed at Polls, Process Faulted,
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 15, 2005, A`7; Charles Krauthammer, Why
Only in Ukraine?, WASHINGTON PO ST, Dec. 3, 2004, A27; Michael
McFaul, Reform and Retreat, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 6, 2005, BW8;
Kim Murphy, Rebellion Creeping Through Caucasus, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2005; Bleak House, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2005, 80; An Empire’s
Fraying Edge, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2005, 21; Vladimir III, THE
ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 2004, 46.
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of World War II, and most nation-states have developed buffers
against threatened international instabilities. These buffers may
prove effective for a long enough period—until Bush and perhaps
Putin leave office, for example.
The Chinese seem faintly bemused by Bush’s and Putin’s
carryings-on, while positioning themselves to take advantage of
any future chaos. China is increasingly projecting itself as a global
power, spending a great deal on a leaner, meaner, more
technologically-adept military. For example, a Chinese-Russian
joint military exercise, Peace 2005, was a classical battle set-piece,
with Russia using the modern equipment China lacks—perhaps to
awe the Chinese and to make U.S. dominance in the region seem
even more tenuous. A very good poker player, China cozies up to
(an anxious) Russia and Central Asian states; the U.S. schmoozes
India and tries to persuade Japan to become more assertive towards
China and Russia. Its insatiable quest for oil and gas has China
competing with India and dealing with countries blacklisted by the
U.S. as troublesome: Myanmar, Sudan, and Iran for example.
Persistent U.S. complaints about Chinese human rights violations,
about inadequate protections of intellectual property, and about
overvaluing its currency (yuan) to boost exports (using much of the
proceeds to, it should be noted, buy the U.S. Treasury liabilities
that finance huge U.S. deficits) have been met only with lukewarm
‘cosmetic’ Chinese responses. Notwithstanding China’s
continuing economic boom, some commentators see China’s
“socialist” (or “planned”— although its 11th Five-Year Plan is
called a “blueprint”) market economy as the ultimate contradiction
in terms. A consumer choice without political choice is believed to
spawn corruption, cronyism, and a growth in the number and scale
of public protests. In any event, this “harmonious society” (the
new buzzword in China) is under threat from a galloping inequality
in the distribution of wealth.41
41

Antoneta Bezlova, Great Leap to Help Rural China, I.P.S., Oct. 14,
2005, 0417 GMT; Paul Blustein, U.S. Urges IMF Crackdown on
{Chinese} Currency, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 24, 2005, D1; Dieter
Farwick, China is Flexing Its Military Might, WORLD SECURITY NET
NEWSLETTER, Sept. 21, 2005 (read of
<newsletter@worldsecuritynetwork.com>); Niall Ferguson, The ManEater of Asia’s Tigers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005; The Cauldron Boils,
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The E.U. attempts to achieve a common foreign policy and
international law reform policy, with (only) a modest degree of
success. THE ECONOMIST goes too far in playing down the E.U.’s
role in international relations and law by likening it to the role of a
Greek chorus (rather than a disorganized cacophony): commenting,
reacting with horror or praise, but playing no part in the action.42
Bush is seen as this play’s tragic protagonist, “hurrying to his

THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 2005, 38; The Dragon Comes Calling, THE
ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2005, 24. Peter Goodwin, China’s Transformation,
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 4, 2005, 10 AM (China’s economy will
stumble at some point given “rickety” banking, water and energy
shortages, social instability, the wastage of capital and “white
elephants”); see note 137 infra (in a statement presumably calculated by
Government, a Chinese General threatened to “nuke” hundreds of U.S.
cities, if the U.S. intervened over Taiwan); id. (a 1998 Chinese Army
publication recognizes the impressibility of challenging the U.S. on its
own terms, so the solution is to subvert banks, stock markets, and
defense contractors; flood the U.S. with drugs; seize natural resources
overseas; paralyze U.S. phones, media, and traffic; and use psychological
warfare); id. (China’s regular “deliberate ambiguity” is something the
Pentagon is not set up to address); Bezlova (the Chinese Public Security
Ministry admitted 74,000 “serious” protests in 2004, involving 3.7
million people—up from 50,000 protests in 2003); id. (in 2005, to Oct.,
23 policemen were killed during “riots” and 1,826 injured); Edward
Cody, China Will Pursue Reforms and Focus on Poverty, WASHINGTON
POST, Oct. 11, 2005 (with no reference to growing protests, a
communiqué stated—“We have to solve the contradictions of the
people”, “their most crucial, direct and unrealistic problems”); id. (no
countervailing power such as an independent court system will be
tolerated, and “the most important thing is to strengthen the ability and
liberty of the party.”); Shasha Trudeau, The Red China of Two Naïve
Guys, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 16, 2005, 8:19 AM (all STAR articles are
read off <thestar.com>) (quoting Shao Ming) “China used to be only one
color—red,” but not it “is many colours”); The Dragon, at 25 (Chinese
leader Hu will ask Bush to treat China as a “market economy” —thus
making the application of U.S> anti-dumping measures more difficult—
but the request is unlikely to be granted).
42
Europe’s Cassandra Complex, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2005, 54
(citing Bob Kagan). Like the E.U., a Greek chorus often supports the
“law”—as in Sophocles’s Antigone, id.
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doom and reckless of the consequences of his actions.”43 Some
neoconservative Americans return the favor, seeing E.U. members
as too disorganized, “cowardly, cynical and decadent to support
America’s courageous and idealistic mission….”44 Admittedly,
France is often prickly and seeks to dominate consensus, Blair’s
Britain is often the outsider of Europe—trying to play poker like
Bush, Europe’s ideological wounds are slow to heal, and the
failure of the new E.U. Constitution in two referenda exposes a
legitimation crisis within Europe. In addition to hiving off Britain,
Bush managed to divide the E.U. further over Iraq: Italy, Poland
and (temporarily) Spain came over to Bush’s “coalition of the
willing.” Despite such disunity on some issues, the E.U. was one
of the few parties that backed the World Summit draft document as
a whole. In comparison, the U.S. proposed 700 amendments to
this draft, while Russia, Cuba, Pakistan, Algeria, Iran and others
also sought extensive changes.45
43

Id.
Lieven, supra note 37, at 34.
45
See note ___ infra (emphasis supplied). See Stefania Bianchi, Amid
Budget Spat, E.U. Searches for the Big Picture, I.P.S., Oct. 28, 2005,
0035 GMT; id. (quoting Alasdair Murray) (all EU countries face similar
challenges to their social models—aging populations, low-wage
competition from Asia and high unemployment in some areas); id. (we
must reach a policy consensus before attempting other reforms); Stefania
Bianchi, U.N. Summit Being Written Off Already, I.P.S., Sept. 21, 2005,
0323 GMT (Luis Morago, head of Oxform, Brussels urges European
leaders to go further on poverty reduction and arms control); Stephen
Castle, China Says Brussels Does Not Care About Job Losses in Assault
on Economic Policy, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 7, 2005, 18:15 (Chirac
stresses the need for an E.U. united front on globalization in “classic
Chirac: defining Europe and France as the same thing.”); Romulo, supra
note 16; Annan Says, supra note 25; To Doha’s Rescue, THE
ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 2005, 13 (Peter Mandelson, the European
commissioner for trade, “needs approval from national governments if he
is to go as far as his American counterpart”); Similarly the negotiating
points of the U.S. must be confirmed by congressional enactment.
On the EU as a major player, see Morton Abrahamowitz and Heather
Hurlbut, Where to Start With Europe, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 9, 2005,
BW5 (reviewing TIMOTHY GORTON ASH, AMERICA, EUROPE, AND THE
SURPRISING FUTURE OF THE WEST, and T.R. REID, THE UNITED STATES
OF EUROPE) (the residual affectation, resilient interdependence, and
44
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The European Commission calls the U.N.’s Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs, infra) “the core” of E.U. development
policy, the “new … consensus” of “a global player.”46 A
nongovernmental organization (NGO) official notes that the E.U.
claims “moral leadership over MDGs”, in what we might call an
important “bet” in a major poker game, but E.U. countries must
“deliver on their promises” through collective action—to be
“credible.”47 Arguably, E.U. performance during the Doha Round
of WTO negotiations (infra) saps its credibility.
A Deputy Secretary-General who recently resigned, the
Canadian Louise Frechette, calls the U.N. the complex center of
just about everything since the end of the Cold War, of high
ambitions and often higher expectations. Outcomes have been
both “notable successes and [the] shattering failures” that rarely
stem from the U.N. simply walking away from a problem.48 As
adaptable, evolving reflections of the world, the members of the
U.N. “family” (which includes international conferences even)
have an international legal personality (without approximating the
organs of a world government), can participate in international
relations independent of their member nation-states, and can create
furious passion of the trans-Atlantic relationship); id. (the Europeans’
“bickering and boredom: and anxiety over “feeling dwarfed by the U.S.
hyperpuissance.”) id. (Ash shows how disunity is “one of the things we
in the West have in common.”); id. (Ash shows how “building a future in
defiance of the other—the Soviet Union in the past, America today,
perhaps in Islam or China tomorrow—is neither sustainable nor
ennobling.”); Editorial: Backward in China, WASHINGTON POST, Dec.
20, 2004, A22.
46
#72 [????] [emphasis supplied).
47
Olivia Ward, Frechette’s U.N. Challenge, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 24,
2005, 8:13 A.M. See notes __ and accompanying text (E.U.’s behavior
over the Doha Round of WTO negotiations).
48
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES,
Introduction, xxv, xxxv (2005); Brietzke, supra note 7; Tony Evans,
International Human Rights as Power/Knowledge, 27 H. RT. Q. 1046,
1054-56 (2005); See notes 5, 17, 26, 51 (quoting Annan). But see note
26, supra: in a 2003 Poll, the U.N.’s “standing” declined in the 20
countries polled, in the U.S. because the U.N. didn’t sanction Iraqi War
II and in the 19 others because it couldn’t prevent it.
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an independent customary international law. But like the E.U., the
U.N. is a major player only when adequate power and resources
are delegated by members, after the requisite consensus is
mustered. Then, the U.N. can build its own distinctive power: the
ability to legitimate or delegitimate political, social, economic, and
even military actions. Lawyers as lawyers like poker games
organized around this legitimation rubric because, among other
things, rules of international law are often created during the
course of play. Some argue that such games serve to conceal
processes of domination, however—including those ostensibly
operating through “markets”, another game rubric thought
legitimate by the U.S., increasingly by China, and tolerated by
many developing countries as a necessary evil under strictures
imposed by the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank, etc.49
A major function of the U.N. is the collective
empowerment of the relatively powerless (i.e., the U.N. sometimes
plays poker hands as a major acting on behalf of minor players), by
offering a forum where minors’ concerns and arguments can be
aired, and a solution to some collective action problems. This can
be seen in a U.N. representation of the sometimes-diffuse interests
of the 118-member Non-Aligned Movement, more powerful
during the Cold War and currently led by Malaysia, India, and
South Africa. This Movement is frequently ignored by widelycirculated media, as is an even less well-known Group of 77 (with
134 members) currently chaired by Jamaica and the Group of 24,
formed in 1971 to unify developing countries’ positions on
monetary policy and development finance. At the other end of the
player spectrum, Bush’s neoconservative surrogates (Norm
Coleman, Tom DeLay, and Henry Hyde, for example) created an
existential crisis when they picked up Bush’s cudgels for use
against another lame duck, Secretary-General Annan, over what
49

5; Commentary: United Nations to the Rescue (of Itself), CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 15, 2005 (U.N. “power lies in getting norms of
behavior and then using a major voice to persuade or shame normbreakers to follow suit.”); and infra notes 106 and 107. Ronald
Saunders, Small States Need a Stronger U.N., CARIBBEAN NET NEWS,
Sept. 27, 2005; Martin Walker, Bush v. Annan: Taming the United
States, 22 (5) WORLD POL’Y J. (Spring 2005) (read off
<worldpolicy.com>).
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amounts to an oil-for-food corruption sidebar (infra) to the World
Summit. This crisis set two of the world’s most impressive “spin
machines” into motion, and the forces of liberal internationalism
prevailed over the neocons: China, Russia, 105 other states and the
E.U., plus the NEW YORK TIMES, WASHINGTON POST, National
Public Radio, and the BBC supported the “bold reformer” Annan
as the best Secretary General since Dag Hammarskjold. (Some see
this as rather faint praise.)50
Like fairies, paper money or perhaps the Soviet Union, the
U.N. would cease to exist (at least as a major player) if people
stopped believing in it. This seems the tactic attempted by U.S.
neoconservatives, along with curbing funding for the U.N., but it is
wildly unrealistic. The U.N. currently oversees 18 peacekeeping
operations, using 8,000 troops. Would the U.S. want to pay for
and pacify these problematic hot spots by itself?51 Rather,
shouldn’t the U.S. want to reform U.N. institutions so as to
strengthen them for this purpose, out of a national self-interest—so
that the U.S. can concentrate on playing poker games with greater
pay-offs? But this was not to be. Accurately forecasting the
outcome from the September 2005 World Summit, Samantha
Powers notes that the “U.N.’s imperfections were manifest from its
creation,” as “built upon … obvious contradictions …. Whatever
they can agree upon {at the Summit} is sure to be disappointing
and will be derided.”52
SUMMITRY
50

Simon Chesterman, Duty Pulls Annan in Two Directions, INT.
HERALD TRIB., Sept. 9, 2005; Thalif Deen, Post-Summit Dilemma of
Promises and Delivery, I.P.S., Sept. 27, 2005; Sebastian Mallaby, Bush’s
Missed U.N. Opportunity, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 12, 2005, A19;
Schlesinger, supra note 35. See Ward, Frechette, supra note 47 (the
U.N. is looked upon as a necessary, and often most competent partner—
for players major and minor); notes ___ and accompanying text, infra
(corruption sidebar).
51
See Samantha Power, To Save the World From Hell, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2005. See id.: 60 years ago, Henry Cabot Lodge,
Jr. said that the U.N. won’t “bring us to heaven”, but it might “save us
from hell.”
52
Id.
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For the U.N., “success never seems to resonate as much as
failure”: disasters in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia53; the U.S.
circumventing collective (Security Council) action over Iraqi War
II; sexual abuse by U.N. troops in the Congo and elsewhere; and
corruption in the oil-for-food program (sidebar, infra). The U.N.
might be thought ineffective because we still face war, injustice,
and poverty, yet we avoided World War III (so far, in no small
measure because of the international law rules governing the
parties’ poker games), and more people now live in countries
where freedoms are protected to some extent by law. The U.N. has
run elections in 90 countries and peacekeeping operations in 60,
helped resolve 170 regional conflicts, and assisted in the
decolonization of 80 countries. Such activities are the primary
cause for a 40% decline in armed conflicts since the end of the
Cold War. The U.N. imposes sanctions on member-miscreants,
and sets up international criminal tribunals and then convinces
members to turn over potential defendants. The High Commission
for Refugees aided 50 million refugees from war, famine or
persecution; the International Atomic Energy Agency (winner of
the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize) searches for W.M.D. and created
security measures for 100 nuclear facilities in 70 countries; and the
World Health Organization wiped out smallpox and markedly
reduced polio.54

53

54

Editorial: Short-Lived Celebration, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005.

Chesterman, supra note 50; Kathryn Horvat & Pat Shea, The U.N.:
60 Years and Still Counting, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 22, 2005 (read off
<sltrib.com>); Edith Lederer, Global Violence Has Decreased, U.N.
Says, WASHINGTON POST/ASSOC. P., Oct. 18, 2005, 9:12 A.M.; Shashi
Tharoor, In Order to Redeem, the United Nations Must Be Redeemed,
THE (Lebanon) DAILY STAR Sept. 15, 2005; Editorial: U.N. is Faced
With New Challenges, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Oct. 24, 2005; U.N. Set,
supra note 37. But see Michael Glennon, Idealism That Won’t Work
(2005) (S.S.R.N. Pap. No. ___) (medicrease in violence “might have
been the result of … growing economic integration, stronger alliances,
military deterrence, more influential N.G.O.s, the reportage of the mass
media, or merely a transnational sense of horror over the barbarism of
war.”); Juan Somovia, The Humanitarian Responsibilities of the U.N.
Security Council (1996) (downloaded from <globalpolicy.com>)
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Past reform efforts were spurred by the vision and political
will of the leaders of particular nation-states, often after a war.
The current round of reform turns this process on its head, by
trying to create political will internally—to make the U.N. more
effective. The fear is that “under performing” U.N. institutions—
some see a U.N. system failure, a series of market (-like) failures in
the provision of public goods like peace and development—will
otherwise be unable to meet new threats and opportunities.55 In
preparation, Secretary-General Annan named a Panel of HighLevel Experts, to report on issues of peace and security56, while
economists led by Jeffrey Sachs considered how the commitments
made at the 2000 Millennium Summit could best be
implemented.57 In March 2005, Annan synthesized their key
recommendations in his manifesto, In Larger Freedom.58 The
Secretary General deliberately set an ambitious and tightlypackaged agenda, given the watering-down and fragmentation that
inevitably results from negotiations (poker games played) over this
agenda. Pakistan, which merits some of the blame for eventual
reform failures, feared that so ‘heavy’ an agenda would lead to
collapse, leaving the Summit with no tangible result.59 (This didn’t
happen, of course: poker and especially ‘advanced poker’ rules are
designed to avoid collapse/no-result at almost any cost.)
Many echo Annan over an essential interrelatedness of the
development, security (including the suppression of terrorism), and
(“sanctions as currently-practiced produce large-scale human insecurity,
the opposite of their intended effect.”).
55
Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Urges Reform Process Forward,
Speech to the World Summit, Sept. 15, 2005, SG/SM/10090/Rev.1*,
GA/10380/Rev.1.
56
See Jean-Maria Guehenno, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29,
2005) (the U.N. under Secretary for Peacekeeping) (the U.N.
investigated 221 peacekeepers over sexual abuse in the Congo,
repatriated 88 soldiers … so some of whom are being prosecuted in their
home country … fired 10 civilians). Tharoor, supra note 54.
57
JEFFREY SACHS, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN
TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM (2004).
58
<un.org/largerfreedom> (UNDP).
59
Brown, supra note 15; Colum Lynch & Glenn Keasler, U.N. Scales
Back Plan of Action, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 14, 2005, A6;
Schlesinger, supra note 35; David Usborne #61.
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respect for human rights, all to be achieved through U.N. reforms.
But the U.S., Russia to a lesser extent, and a relatively few minor
players persisted in pulling at any snag or frayed edge that
emerged when Annan’s proposals were put under negotiating
stress. In effect, these players chose to play many separate poker
games—not of the ‘advanced’ variety—for narrow, short-term, and
sometimes-misperceived gains. A U.N. culture of inaction absent
consensus enabled these players to shape non-reform outcomes, as
the economists’ “holdouts” —veto groups whose existence is made
possible by the extraordinarily high “transaction costs” of U.N.
reform. Annan’s hope for an idealized, grand social contract (or a
single, idealized ‘advanced poker’ game) were dashed—developed
countries genuinely working to alleviate Third World poverty, in
exchange for developing countries’ support for the reforms
developed countries sought. But Annan was careful not to
challenge the permanent members of the Security Council—those
with a veto or, roughly, what are called the major poker players
here—since their power and consensus is essential to any
successful reform. 60 Had the U.S. stood with the other majors,
would it have been possible to isolate Russia and eliminate
(through a broad range of coercions) the minor-player holdouts?
The logic of poker suggests “yes.”
The Summit, “the 900 pound gorilla, … the largest in
history,” occurred when about 170 nation-state leaders gathered for
a “once-in-a-generation” opportunity for U.N. reform61, in New
York during September 2005. Mark Malloch Brown says that, on
the morning the Summit opened, negotiations were “heading off
60

#51; Edith M. Lederer, Leaders Fall Short on Larger Goals in Effort
to Fight Poverty, Terrorism at U.N. Summit, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
9/17/05; Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, The Alternative U.N., LE
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2005. The holdouts “spoiler countries”
variously include the U.S., Russia, Myanmar, Turkemenistan, Belarus,
India, Vietnam, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran. #5;
Nick Wadhams, General Assembly OKs Compromise Document, AP,
Sept. 13, 2005. The people deserve better than this disingenuous horse
trading; there is no evidence of the political will to stop, e.g., another
Rwanda, id. See note ___ and text accompanying, infra (some effects of
the holdouts).
61
Olivia Ward, U.N. Faces the Fight of its Life, TORONTO STAR, Sept.
12, 2005, 1:00 A.M.
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the rails”, with 140 passages and 27 issues still left undecided.62
Annan and the incoming and outgoing General Assembly
Presidents took “a high-risk gamble”: deleted contentious matters
from the draft Summit outcome, adopted alternative language they
thought could win approval, and submitted a “clean” copy to
members—who then adopted it quickly.63 Everyone had to
“compromise”64, something our ‘advanced poker’ model predicts,
as it does the narrow limitations on such compromises—composed
as they are of diverse national interests and desires to “win.”
In any event, Annan’s proposals were criticized for
ignoring the complexities of global society, and for the
impossibility of reform where the major powers refuse to give up
their prerogatives. Secretary-General Annan did much to open up
U.N. processes to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs,
including corporations, as “stakeholders” in a civil society),
arguably to open up and solidify ‘advanced poker’ as the dominant
game. But NGOs strongly objected to a lack of control over the
Summit agenda, and the lack of access to closed-door negotiations
among nation-states. In contrast, the Helsinki Summit and the
(Bill) Clinton Global Initiative, held just before and just after the
U.N. Summit respectively, made room for NGO participation in
the “intense dialogue” no longer possible at the U.N. “because of
highly ritualistic structures, protocol and conflict avoidance.”65
The “multi-stakeholder” Helsinki process will go forward under

62

Edith Lederer, U.N. Summit Leaders to Adopt Weak Document,
SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 15, 2005 (read off
<seattlepi.com>).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Glenn Kessler, Clinton Gathers World Leaders, WASHINGTON POST,
Sept. 16, 2005, A2 (quoting Richard Holbrook, U.N. Ambassador under
Clinton). See Sanjay Suri, Development: NGOs Talk, Governments
Listen, IPS, Sept. 7, 2005, 02:05 GMT; Monique Chemillier-Gendreau,
The Alternative U.N., LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2005; 117, supra
note __, 134; (Clinton reportedly wanted to be Secretary General, and is
skilled at “building bridges”); Coate, supra note 1; Maggie Farley, U.N.
Reform Bid Exposes its Woes, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005; Sanjay Suri,
NGOs Talk, Governments Listen, I.P.S., Sept. 6, 2005 (70 governments
and 600 NGOs at Helsinki).
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two NGOs, the Celso Furtado Centre in Sao Paolo, Brazil, and the
Brookings Institution in Washington.66
NGO officials also came up with specific criticisms of
Summit outcomes: e.g., “We wanted a bold agenda to tackle
poverty but instead we have a brochure showcasing past
commitments” and omitting, e.g., women’s rights issues.67 Only
democratic, “comprehensive, radical and transparent reform of the
U.N. will enable this system to fulfill its historical role….”68 The
“watered-down” language of the “cleverly-crafted” Summit
outcome document shows the U.N. becoming “the biggest talk—
but not act—shop in the world.”69 The Mauritius Ambassador
speaks of a “least common denominator” Summit outcome
document70 which, according to a political science professor, will
not move the world toward promoting human security.71 There
was a leadership vacuum, which is what the poker analogy would
lead us to expect. Clare Short finds “depression and mistrust”72,
66

Sanjay Suri, Development: Straight Talk Expected at Post-Helsinki
Roundtables, I.P.S., Sept. 14, 2005; Goday, supra note 66. [?????}
67
Edith M. Lederer, Annan Appeals to World Leaders at Summit,
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 14, 2005 (quoting Oxfam’s Nicola Reindorp).
See #38; notes ___ and accompanying text, infra (MDGs). Oxfam’s
4,000 partner organizations in 70 countries promote dignity and
development. Juan Somavia, The Humanitarian Responsibilities of the
U.N. Security Council (downloaded from <globalpolicy.org>).
68
Elisa Marincola, Summit Ignores People’s U.N., IPS, Sept. 16, 2005
(quoting Antonio Papisca of the University of Padua’s Centre for Human
Rights). See Haider Rizvi, Anger at Washington Simmers on Eve of U.N.
Meet, IPS, Sept. 1, 2005.
69
Thalia Deen, March Toward MDGs Leaving Millions Behind, IPS,
Sept. 16, 2005 (quoting Saradha Iyer, of Malaysia’s Third World
Network). See Ward, supra note 47 (document is “heavy on rhetoric and
light on substance.”
70
#61 (quoting the Ambassador). See id. (quoting Mark Malloch
Brown): “we always knew we wouldn’t get the full loaf. We’ve got to
start counting slices.”
71
Coate, supra note 1.
72
Clare Short: Depression and Mistrust Prevail at the U.N., THE
INDEPENDENT ONLINE, Sept. 15, 2005 (quoting former British Minister
Short). See Mary Robinson, A New Way of Doing the World’s Business,
INT. HERALD TRIB., Sept. 25, 2005 (a leadership vacuum deprived the
summit of “backbone”).
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which we might see as attitudes making ‘advanced poker’ less
likely. According to Mary Robinson, the U.N. “had its bluff
called….”73 Venezuela’s Foreign Minister objected to the “antidemocratic” negotiation process, and especially to having to
approve the outcome document before it was translated into
Spanish.74 But the elliptical ECONOMIST finds the document “not
wholly devoid of substance.”75
American neoconservatives are even more critical: e.g.,
Brett Schaefer sees the Summit as another step on the path towards
U.N. irrelevance, inefficiency, and more low-priority, costly
mandates.76 John Yoo agrees with this characterization, but goes
on to argue that the U.N. reforms will markedly increase
transaction costs—thus reducing the U.N.’s ability to solve
collective action problems.77 For Nicholas Kristof, the Summit
was history’s biggest gathering of “hypocrites”, who “preen and
boast”; along with the Italians and Japanese, “Americans set a
dreadful example.”78

73

Id.
Edith Lederer, Leaders Fall Short of Larger Goals in Effort to Fight
Poverty, Terrorism at the U.N. Summit, AP, Sept. 17, 2005 (read off
<ABC.com>) (quoting Minister Rodriguez).
75
Better Than Nothing, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2005, 33. See
Thalif Dean, supra note 69 (quoting Jamaica’s Foreign Minister Knight,
speaking for the Group of 77) (the Summit outcome at best “a bag of
mixed results”); George Mitchell, Don’t Write Off U.N. Reform Just Yet,
INT. HERALD TRIB., Oct. 11, 2005 (document “papered over many
differences and skirted other issues”, but it “establishes a starting point”
and a consensus is building); Nahal Toosi, Annan Depends Summit’s
Accomplishments, Agrees Some Results Were Nixed, A.P. NEWSDAY,
Oct. 17, 2005, 3:15 EDT (while the absence of progress on nonproliferation a “disgrace”, administrative reforms were nixed, the
Millennium Development Goals were “endorsed”, and the peacebuilding
commission is a valuable creation).
76
Brett D. Schaefer, The U.N. Summit Document: At What Cost?, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Sept. 21, 2005 (quoting the Heritage
Foundation’s Schaefer).
77
Yoo, supra note 8.
78
Nicholas D. Kristof, Meet the Fakers, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sept.
13, 2005.
74
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With some justification, much of the blame for reform
failures is attributed to John Bolton, Bush’s recess appointment as
U.N. Ambassador—because the (Republican-dominated) Senate
refused to confirm him. (Some see Bush’s appointment as the
abandonment of a bipartisan foreign policy.) The bull in the china
shop who stalemated the Summit for most observers, Bolton was
regarded by the U.S. neoconservatives as showing that the U.N.
emperor has no clothes. At Bolton’s request, all references to the
International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol were deleted
from the document. But he was unsuccessful at deleting all
quantitative goals relating to the Millennium Development
Initiative. Speaking at the Summit, Bush got to play “good cop” to
Bolton’s “bad cop”, and the consensus was of a pleasant surprise
over Bush’s more conciliatory “moral obligation” to go along with
much of the outcome document.79 However, our poker analogy
suggests that Bolton could not have had so significant an impact on
the Summit without disruptions from the Russians and especially
from the minor-player holdouts that, like the U.S., were grinding

79

Haider Rizvi, Anger at Washington Simmers on Eve of U.N. Meet,
I.P.S., Sept. 14, 2005; Barbara Slavin, Bolton Dives Right in to Effort to
Change U.N., USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 2005; Celia Dugger, U.N. vs.
Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005; Maggie Farley & Warren Vieth,
Bush, Annan Tout Role of the U.N., L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005; Better
Than Nothing, supra note 75; U.N. Set Out, supra note 37. See Evelyn
Leopold, Fears Grow of Meltdown at Ambitious U.N. Summit, REUTERS,
Sept. 11, 2005 19:17:19 GMT (quoting David Schorr) (Bolton’s
“overreaching by niggling over small stuff rather than shoring up the
major items.”); Jonathan Beale, Strained Relations for U.S. & U.N., BBC
News, Aug. 8, 2005, 0210 GMT (the man Bolton replaced at the U.N.,
Nicholas Burns, had worked hard and collaboratively); Klaus Brinkbaum
& Greg Mascolo, The Gangs of New York, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Sept. 26,
2005 (Bolton downgraded “the final document to little more than a
meaningless sketchpad of world politics.”); Thalif Deen, U.S.-U.N.
Relations May be on a Collision Course, I.P.S., Aug. 5, 2005 (quoting
James Paul Bolton is like an atheist appointed as ambassador to the
Vatican); id. (“through threats and blackmail,” the U.S. tries to bend the
U.N. to its will—without breaking it); Appendix, infra (the MDG
quantitative goals that remained).
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very different axes, trying to win short-term games for their own
purposes and in distinctive ways.
These reform and non-reform outcomes will be discussed
under eight headings: the composition of, and voting arrangements
in, the Security Council; U.N. powers of intervention and the new
“responsibility to protect” against genocide and war crimes;
terrorism, a central concern of the U.S. and the U.K.; a new
Peacebuilding Commission, to help nations emerging from
conflict; the non-proliferation of W.M.D., and of ordinary weapons
as well; management and administration within the U.N.; human
rights; and (non-) implementation of the Millennium Development
Goals. How all of this will be paid for remains to be seen, of
course; this is a topic of little interest to players totaling up their
wins and losses at poker.80
The Security Council (S.C.)
The S.C. will remain an unreformed “aristocratic”
(undemocratic) yet rather “toothless” “executive” body, which
suffers from a “credibility deficit.”81 For example, fears of a
Chinese and/or Russian veto have so far stopped the S.C. from a
needed and otherwise-feasible humanitarian intervention in Darfur,
in Sudan. Many minor players are opposed to reform of the S.C.,
as conducive to marginalizing the General Assembly (G.A.)—in
what is assumed to be a zero-sum (poker) game between them.
More modest (transaction cost- reducing) reforms of the G.A., the
minor-players’ bailiwick, were approved by the Summit—
streamlining committee structures, speeding up deliberations, and
80

Main Divisive Issues Before World U.N. Summit, REUTERS
ALERTNET, Sept. 5, 2005, 0531GMT. See Julio Godoy, ‘Summit Will
Look for the Money’, IPS, Sept. 13, 2005 (examining proposals to raise
global Tobin taxes on currency speculation, environmentally-hazardous
activities, and corporate profits); note ___, supra (holdouts). The MDGs
are listed in the Appendix.
81
See Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 65 (S.C. has allowed conflicts
to proliferate and intervened arbitrarily); Deen, Despite Strictures, supra
note 37 (the S.C. fails to define its own parameters and responsibilities
in, e.g., the Iraq oil-for-food program, and is inherently flawed by the
lack of democracy—the vetoes of permanent members are a recipe for
paralysis and failure). But see note ___ and accompanying text, infra.
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rationalizing the G.A. agenda—despite an apparent preference
among members of the G.A. for paralyzing, protracted debates.
Poker analyses show why “democratizing” reforms to the S.C.—
e.g., eliminating permanent membership and thus vetoes—went
nowhere. (Even Bush/Bolton were uncharacteristically coy about
this reform, perhaps because they knew it was doomed to
failure).82
Permanent S.C. members are roughly coextensive with our
major poker players, the E.U. getting two S.C. ‘half’-vetoes:
Britain and/or France don’t always reflect interests of the E.U. as a
whole. Denied a S.C. veto, one or more major players could rather
easily find another way to wreck any disagreeable (to them) game
created by many or most minor players through the G.A. The
failure of many important G.A. (one state, one vote) resolutions
attest to this power. Similarly, creating additional permanent
members, with or without a veto, is bound to fail de facto, since
this would increase transaction costs and give middle-level players
a (quasi-major-player) power they cannot currently win by playing
games with the other majors. In any event, the other members
were unable to choose two new permanents (a step recommended
in Annan’s In Greater Freedom) from among the lobbying
aspirants: Japan, India, Germany, Brazil, and South Africa
(although the African Union wanted two permanent seats from
Africa). Alternatively, Italy, Canada, Pakistan, Mexico, and 16
other countries proposed ten additional temporary (rotating) S.C.
seats: this is a feasible increase in representativeness, but it would
come at the price of significantly higher transaction costs in the
S.C.’s production of public goods. In the end, no formal votes
were taken on these reforms, and the Summit final document
contained an anodyne “commitment” to make the S.C. “more
broadly representative, more efficient and transparent.”83 But the
82

Evelyn Leopold, Fears Grow of Meltdown at Ambitious U.N.
Summit, REUTERS, Sept. 11, 2005, 19:17:19 GMT; Remarks by Louise
G. Frechette, Deputy Secretary-General, United Nations, ABA Day at
the UN, Mar. 29, 2005; 73, Chemimllier-Gendreau, supra note 65;
Mallaby, supra note 34; Posner, supra note 8; Darfur’s Despair, THE
ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 2005, 47.
83
Richard Black, U.N. Reforms Receive Mixed Response, BBC News,
Sept. 17, 2005, 0730 GMT (quoting the document). See Mark Turner,
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debate over S.C. seats, what some describe as the Summit’s
biggest failure—to deal with an issue which had been percolating
for a decade, “sucked the oxygen from other issues and divided the
member states ….”84 Thoroughgoing reforms are arguably needed,
so that the S.C. better defends law: the rule of international law is
widely regarded as endangered. The S.C. must also become more
accountable, transparent, and legitimate—e.g., to counter its image
of “the fox guarding the chicken coop”; and it must adopt more
permanent and effective procedures.85

Terrorism
A recent study shows “international terrorism” to be the
only form of political violence that is on the increase.
Political/organizational/technological innovations enable terrorist
NGOs (whether we like this or not) to do things which were
formerly the province of rogue nation-states, things which render a
national self-defense almost impossible and which make terrorist
organizations able to grab a seat at a poker table and often disrupt
the game. For the U.S., Britain, and perhaps some other countries,
this justifies an oxymoronic anticipatory retaliation (infra) as a
game-move. The obvious risk this tactic poses to peace and
security, when misused in Iraqi War II games for example, seems a
prime motive behind U.N. attempts to regulate terrorism. A
Convention Against Nuclear Terrorism, based on Russian
U.N. “Must Never Again be Found Wanting on Genocide’, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005; 112a; Evelyn Leopold, Like Fixing the Weather,
Council Reform Eludes U.N., REUTERS ALERTNET, Sept. 19, 2005, 0854
GMT; Andrew Teitelbaum, All We Can Hope is That Things Don’t Get
Worse, I.P.S., SEPT. 24, 2005, 1418 GMT; Yoo, supra note 8.
84
Chesterman, supra note 50. See Thalif Deen, U.N.’s Authority
Tested by Perils Ahead, I.P.S., Dec. 27, 2005.
85
James Paul & Celine Nahory, Theses Toward a Democratic Reform
of the U.N. Security Council, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, July 13, 2005
(downloaded from <globalpolicy.org>). See Somovia, supra note 54;
Swiss Government, Working Methods of the Security Council July 2005
(17 recommendations in a “non paper” downloaded from
<globalpolicy.org>).
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proposals and criticized for omitting prohibitions on a state
terrorism, was nevertheless approved by the G.A. and opened for
signature by leaders at the World Summit. It is the latest of
thirteen anti-terrorism conventions. Still, some think that terrorism
is inadequately outlawed by international law, especially those
who believe that this inadequacy licenses intervention by one or a
few countries. Britain’s Tony Blair thus proposed Security
Council Resolution 1624, which passed unanimously during the
Summit. Under it, all members must now “prevent incitement” to
terrorism, deny safe haven to terrorists, and (a Blair preoccupation)
“counter violent extremist ideologies.”86 But Kumi Naidoo, an
NGO official and former African National Congress (ANC)
activist, argues that 1624 is of “no effect” without a definition of
“terrorism” from the Summit G.A.87 Human Rights Watch and
Human Rights First disagree: oppressive governments can use a
86

U.N. Security Council Passes Resolutions Related to Terrorism,
JERUSALEM POST INTERNATIONAL Sept. 14, 2005, (quoting S.C. Res.
1624). See Andrew Grice, Blair Frustrated as U.N. Fails to Agree on
Anti-terror Action, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 15, 2005; Lederer, Global
Violence, supra note 54; Haider Rizvi, U.N. Treaty Targets Rogue
Nukes, IPS, Sept. 13, 2005; Yoo, supra note 8; Security Council Meeting
at Summit Level Unanimously Adopts Anti-Terror Steps, Sept. 14, 2005
(downloaded from <un.org>).
87
Black, supra note 85 (quoting Naidoo). The High-Level Panel
suggested a terrorism definition: “any action, in addition to … {those in}
existing conventions …, the Geneva Conventions and … {S.C. Res.}
1566, that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians
or non-combatants.” Rizvi, U.N. Treaty, supra note 68 (quoting the
Panel). The definition proposed by Annan is: “Any action constitutes
terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to
civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a
population or compelling a government or an international organization
to do or abstain from doing any act.” Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note
65 (quoting Annan). Bolton’s proposed language involved “the targeting
and deliberate killing of civilians … when the purpose …, but its nature
or context, is to intimidate a population or compel a government or
international organization {which} cannot be justified on any grounds
….” Patrick Goodenough, U.N. Summit Document Won’t Define
Terrorism, Sept. 14, 2005 (quoting Bolton) (downloaded from
<CNSNews.com>). No such definition, or any other, was adopted by the
World Summit: see supra note 79 and accompanying text, infra.
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vague “prevent” and “incitement” to punish a non-violent
criticism88, and I would add that the obligation to “counter …
ideologies” can be used to similar effect.
The Summit outcome document offered a therapeutic
concession to developed countries, especially the U.S. and Britain,
by promising to “make all efforts” towards yet another convention,
and condemning “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,
committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes.”89
But, as Naidoo notes, Muslim nations scotched any definition of
“terrorism” which prohibits attacks on civilians, a definition
needed to make the statement in the Summit document operative,
for fear that such a definition would delegitimate, e.g., Palestinian
self-determination efforts and rights to resist occupation. Naidoo
adds that some thought the ANC a terrorist organization, but it now
governs South Africa. Perhaps unconsciously echoing former
President Reagan’s view of the Nicaraguan Contras, Naidoo
concludes: “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom
fighter.”90 While China and Russia want the U.N. to help
coordinate anti-terrorism efforts, the Bush Administration (much
like China and Russia, if they are honest) wants a carte blanche for
unilateral action—with U.N. coordination only for “fringe” issues
like money laundering. Placing security above development, Bush
has moved further away from multilateral aid, arguably to
militarize and funnel aid to, e.g., Pakistan and Israel. These are
instances of regime rather than developmental support, huge
“plunger” bets in pursuit of short-term game payoffs, rather than
playing the more profitable, long-term ‘advanced poker’ that
88

See Grice, supra note 86, Mithre Sondrasagrn, U.N. Terror
Resolution Overly Vague, HWR Says, I.P.S., Sept. 14, 2005; Human
Rights First, Security Council’s Counterterrorism Resolution Open to
Abuse By Authoritarian Governments, n.d. (downloaded from
<humanrightsfirst.org>). See #41 (for Benin’s President, anti-terrorism
requires scrupulous respect for state sovereignty, international human
rights, and international humanitarian law); id. for Romania’s President,
anti-terrorism can be “sustained” only by S.C. action). But see
Sondrasagra (quoting the Danish Prime Minister): “Freedom of speech
… must never be an excuse for inciting terrorism and fostering hatred.”
89
Black, supra note 83 (quoting the document).
90
Id. (quoting Naidoo). See Hughes, supra note ___; U.N. Set, supra
note 37, supra.
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require a more equitable, broadly-based development. At the same
time, few believe the E.U.’s holier-than-thou rhetoric over
development aid (either).91 Most treat it like any other bet in a
short-term game, because it is not backed by reduction in the E.U.
subsidies to European agriculture that leave most developing
countries without access to European agricultural markets.
Intervention
The Summit attempted to breathe new life into multilateral
actions, in what proved to be an imperfect reform in organizational
and nation-state priorities. Perception of collective security threats
have changed, with W.M.D., terrorism, humanitarian crises,
disaster relief, discriminatory ideologies, genocide, and
abductions—especially of aid workers, becoming more prominent
as threats. Also, complaints are prevalent that such interventions
as occur are often arbitrary, that Security Council consensus
resolutions are often too restrictive for a “robust” peacekeeping,
and that donor peacekeeping aid usually arrives too late.
Nonetheless, U.N. conflict prevention (and peacebuilding, infra)
efforts are becoming more numerous and more effective.
Operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone ended more or less
successfully in 2005, and a recent Rand Corp. study found 66% of
U.N. peacekeeping efforts to be successful. But even if, as some
argue, the true figure is 40%, this is an achievement since
collective peacekeeping did not really exist prior to the 1990s.92
91

See Grice, supra note 86; Sanjay Suri, Political Strings Tie Up U.S.
Aid, I.P.S., Sept. 24, 2005.
92
Lederer, Global Violence, supra note 54. See Chemillier-Gendreau,
supra note 65; Power, supra note 51; Gordon Brown & Hilary Benn,
Let’s Put On Some Institutional Muscle, INT. HERALD TRIB., Oct. 19,
2005 (to deal with natural disasters, the following must be augmented
and better coordinated—the emergency jurisdiction of the IMF and the
World Bank, the U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
and the U.N. Emergency Revolution Fund); Howard LaFranchi, A
Welcome Surprise: War Waning Globally, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 18, 2005 (read off <scmonitor.com>); Haider Rizvi, U.N.
Blue Helmets Earn Applause—and Censure, I.P.S., Dec. 30, 2005; Yoo,
supra note 8 (humanitarian crises include systematic human rights
violations and the collapse of central authority—or hijacking by nonstate actors and involve individual liability as well as collective action
problems). Yoo, id.; arguably proves the reformers’ case when he notes
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Summiteers sitting as the Security Council passed another
Resolution unanimously, 1625, which is aimed at conflict
prevention (especially in Africa) and calls for preventative
diplomacy, regional mediation, an early-warning system for
potential conflicts, promoting fairness and transparency in
elections, and acting against the illegal exploitation of resources
such as diamonds.93 Many also see a need to break the worldwide
‘Hobbesian’ cycle of war-conquest-‘empire’-oppressionsuccession-anarchy, and back to war. This cycle is based on the
incentives and capacities for a violent, collective self-help: for
example, the ability to coerce would-be “free riders” and to attract
an external support for your cause—or to create a unifying distrust
of external opposition. (These incentives and capacities can often
be altered non-violently by, e.g., effective recognition of the right
to self-determination).94
Romeo Dalliare, the Canadian General who headed U.N.
peacekeeping in Rwanda, complains that the “Mogadishu rule” (in
effect since the U.S. pulled out of Somalia in 1990) governs: “the
sense of responsibility to human beings” loses out “against the
self-interested demands imposed by the governments and …by
their peoples and structures.”95 In other words, the initial S.C.
decision to play ‘advanced poker’ over Rwanda was later deserted
by players whose support and resources the U.N. needed, players
who were not altogether free agents since they operated under
‘domestic’ strictures. These deserting players thus reverted to
short-term, non-peacekeeping (poker) games where perceived
payoffs were greater. Dalliare contrasts Rwanda with the selfinterested (ostensibly security-based) intervention in Yugoslavia,
where people are white—‘like us’ and living closer to us. He
that between the Korean War and Iraqi War I (1991) 75-80% of deaths
from violent conflict came from intrastate conflicts that the U.N. Charter
drafters did not see as threats to peace.
93
Security Council Meeting, supra note 86.
94
Brietzke, Globalization, supra note 7; Paul Brietzke, SelfDetermination, Self-Determination, or Jurisprudential Confusion
Exacerbating Political Conflict, 14 WIS. INT. L.J. 69 (1995) _____.
95

Romeo Dalliare, interviewed by MOTHER JONES (Jan. 2005)
(downloaded from <cbc.ca/news>).
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concludes that conflict resolution requires more enlightened and
multi-skilled peacekeeper/humanitarians, who must be given a firm
S.C. mandate to protect the people caught between warring
participants.96
Interventions by another country (rather than the U.N.) are
traditionally restricted to self-defense, or interventions otherwise
permitted under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. Bush’s assertion of
a unilateral right of anticipatory retaliation, especially as misplayed during his Iraq poker hands, alerted the world community
to the need for legal action. The High-Level Panel thus
recommended a five-pronged interpretive loosening of Chapter 7
strictures, an effort Michael Glennon labels “wishful thinking.”97
When this proposal is combined with the inability of the members
of the International Criminal Court to define “aggression”, and
with polls which show diverse national interpretations of “peace”
(and even “development”, infra), Glennon concludes that a
“legalist solution” to a profligate use of force is highly
improbable.98
96

Id. See Somavia, supra note 67. Humanitarian interventions require
“a series of interlocking legal and logistical safeguards—shored up by
the political will of countries … and operationalized through a coherent
U.N. system … functioning with NGOs and regional and local
governments. A separate convention (treaty) is needed to protect
nongovernmental personnel affiliated with U.N. relief efforts, id. But see
Rizvi, supra note 68 (since the 1990 failure in Somalia, U.N.
peacekeeping operations have become more aggressive and less
“neutral”, in Haiti for example, resulting in the death of 91 peacekeepers
in 2004).
97
Michael Glennon, Idealism That Won’t Work (2005) (SSRN Pap.
No. ___). Glennon, id. lists the Panel’s five “criteria of legitimacy”: is
the threat sufficiently serious, is the purpose proper, has every
nonmilitary option been exhausted, is the military action proportionate to
the threat, and is there a reasonable chance of success? For Yoo, supra
note ___, these criteria will not forestall the use of self-defense as a
pretext for illegality. Bush must have been irked when, during the World
Summit, the new Iranian President called Bush’s anticipatory retaliation
a “blatant contradiction to the very foundations o f the U.N. and the letter
and spirit of its charter.” Tyler Marshall, Iran Leader’s First U.N.
Speech Has a Pretty Clear Target, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005.
98
Glennon, supra note 19.
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Nonetheless, Annan and, later, the World Summit outcome
document, adopted a Canadian (and human rights NGOs’)
initiative: the “responsibility to protect”, through uninhibited
action, civilian populations against genocide or war crimes, when
their governments are “unable or unwilling” to do so.99 This
language was adopted despite assertions that it infringes state
sovereignty, despite fears of endless S.C. debates—as over
Rwanda and Darfur, and despite developing countries’ (including
chronic human rights abusers’) fears that this “responsibility”
would give major players (especially the U.S.) an excuse to
intervene. The thoughtful former U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights and President of Ireland, Mary Robinson, praises
this World Summit (game) move, while adding that it is only the
single leg of a stool where the others failed to materialize: human
rights improvements, control over trade in small arms (“the real
W.M.D.’s”), and especially, progress over development; the G-8’s
“triumphal announcements” came off “looking hollow.”100
99

Black, supra note 83 (quoting the document). See Iraz Hussein, Is
the Glass of U.N. Reforms Half Full?, (Pakistan) DAILY TIMES, Oct. 7,
2005 (read off <unwire.org>) (between 1827 and 1914, the U.S.
intervened in Latin American countries 70 times on “humanitarian”/’duty
to protect’ grounds; the “principle alone is not sufficient”); Sanders,
supra note ___; Ward, U.N. Blocks, supra note ___; Main Divisive
Issues, supra note 80.
100
Robinson, supra note 72. See Mark Turner, U.N. ‘Must Never Again
be Found Wanting on Genocide’, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005 (for
Zimbabwe’s Mugabe, “responsibility to protect” can be a cynical ploy in
an aggressive foreign policy); #121 (quoting Rwanda’s Foreign Minister
Murigande (will the document “lead to lengthy academic or legal debates
on what constitutes genocide or crimes against humanity, while people
die?”); id. (the U.N. has “consistently neglected to learn from its
mistakes” in, e.g., Rwanda); Brinkbaumer & Muscala, supra note ___;
Ward, U.N. Backs, supra note 47; Better Than Nothing, supra note 75.
On development and the G8, see notes ___ and accompanying text, infra.
While the Bush Administration has moved too slowly over Darfur, a
no-fly zone has not been imposed, and there has been no NATO
deployment. But the U.N. is even slower. Darfur’s Despair, supra note
82; Editorial: Negotiating With Genocide, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 9,
2005, B6; Main Divisive, supra note 80. U.S. Ambassador Bolton (plus
China, Algeria, and Russia) thus blocked a U.N. envoy from briefing the
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Peacebuilding
The (post-conflict) Peacebuilding Commission is an
important World Summit reform which generated no reported
disagreements during negotiations. Perhaps this is because the
Commission formalizes and institutionalizes steps already being
pursued by consensus, sometimes as logical extensions of more
overt interventions and now to create an in-house expertise and
training in mediation and “good offices.” Past efforts show how
non-violent interventions by third parties can bridge deep hatreds
to build communication and trust among the parties. U.N.
mediators have helped free hostages, resolve border and electoral
disputes, and forge peace agreements in the Cambodia, El
Salvador, and Guatemala of the 1990s. In particular, Lakhdar
Brahimi navigated deep ethnic and political divisions while
creating the “road map” for Afghan governance.101
As an effort which overlaps some U.N. Development
Program (U.N.D.P.) projects, $42 million has been raised from 39
countries—and especially from the U.S., India, and Australia—to
create a new Democracy Fund (U.N.D.E.F.). The idea is to fill in
the gaps experienced by countries in transit from some kind of
authoritarianism. The anticipated projects include: the creation of
civil societies; the rule of law; political parties; independent courts;
a “free press”; trades unions; enhanced monitoring, evaluation, and
auditing capacities; more professionalized civil and military
establishments; and programs to safeguard the rights of women,
children, and minorities. No particular democratic model will be
endorsed, no (IMF- or World Bank-style) conditionality will be
imposed on the aid given, and the Fund will report to the General
Assembly. Both of these reforms look like useful ways to
restructure domestic games, to make an ‘advanced poker’ more

S.C. about human rights violations in Darfur: action rather than talk is
required.
101
La Franchi, supra note ___; Lederer, Global Violence, supra note
(43}; Editorial: Making Peace Work, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005.
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common and more likely to yield cooperative, positive-sum
outcomes.102
Non-Proliferation
In contrast to the peacebuilding successes described in the
last two paragraphs, Secretary-General Annan noted that the World
Summit “could not even agree on a paragraph on non-proliferation
and disarmament, and I … {find this} a disgrace and a real
failure.”103 We might see in this the same kind of failure described
earlier and later: too many players preoccupied with (perhaps
misperceived) short-term gains potentially available from smaller,
non-‘advanced poker’ (uncooperative, zero-sum) games.104 As
things stand, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) allows the U.S.,
Britain, France, China, and Russia to possess nuclear weapons, but
requires them to disarm. Other state-parties are strictly prohibited
from having them. India, Pakistan, and Israel have not signed the
NPT however, and North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2002.
Nuclear-free countries supported the NPT in the past because of
the nuclear “haves’” promise to disarm, but this is being
undermined by Bush’s refusal to disarm, by other Bush/Bolton
actions105, by Russia106, and by actions of others. The most
102

Ayesha Gooneratne, U.N. Launches New Democracy Fund, I.P.S.,
Oct. 12, 2005. See notes ___ and accompanying text, supra (‘advanced
poker’). But see also Robin Wright, Middle East Democracy Summit
Ends in Rancor, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 12, 2005 9:38 A.M.: Bush’s
Forum for the Future, held in Bahrain, ended without a formal agreement
on democracy promotion, Egypt—thought to be dependent on U.S.
foreign aid—insisting on Arab governments’ control over which
democracy groups receive aid.
103
Nick Wahams, General Assembly OKs Compromise Document, ASK
JEEVES, Sept. 13, 2005, 10:10 (downloaded from <ask.com>) (quoting
Annan).
104
See text following note ___ {51) supra; notes ___ and
accompanying text, infra.
105
Xin Benjian, Who’s Pushing Nuclear Proliferation, PEOPLE’S DAILY
ONLINE, Oct. 27, 2005 (the 44-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, which
exerts export controls—especially when the importer has not signed the
NPT—turned down the U.S. request to offer access to India); id. (this
attempt makes it more difficult for the U.S. to win support from the
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dangerous ‘other’ is Pakistani scientist and black marketeer, A.Q.
Khan. He facilitated a proliferation by North Korea, a potential
proliferation by Iran and Libya, and by who knows where else,
feeling that Muslim countries had their nuclear weapons desires
thwarted while Israel and India were given free rein.107 He is such
a nationalist hero as to be untouchable by the international
community—so long as he stays in Pakistan.
international community to not supply North Korea and Iran); Hudson,
supra note ___ (“The U.S. seeks to reinterpret the NPT as legitimizing
the possession of weapons by existing nuclear states, while using it as the
justification for confrontation with states accused of proliferation.”); id.
(countries resent this “do-what-we-say-not-as-we-do” attitude); id. (the
U.S. proposes to develop new nukes, for use even against non-nuclear
states); id. (the question arises—“who exactly are we deterring?”);
Colum Lynch, Bolton Criticizes Bill Withholding U.N. Funds,
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 28, 2005, A20 (asked in Congress why he
didn’t strike deals at the Summit for non-proliferation of biological and
chemical weapons, Bolton said “We ‘tried very hard’ but were opposed
by countries who saw the U.S. rather than rogue states as the prime
proliferators); Jacques Hymans, Think Again: Nuclear Proliferation,
FOREIGN POLICY, Nov. 2005 (read off <foreignpolicy.com>) (Americans
“squander” non-proliferation opportunities through a … tendency to
lecture rather than to listen.”).
106
E.g., Ted Turner & Stanley Weiss, Avoiding A Russian Arms
Disaster, WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005 (downloaded from
<washingtontimes.com>) (half of Russia’s weapons-grade nuclear
materials are poorly protected, as are shells of VX and Sarin nerve gas,
and the Nunn/Lugar program that has eliminated some Russian nukes is
now under threat from Congress).
107
Douglas Frantz, From Patriot to Proliferator, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23,
2005. See Hudson, supra note ___ (in 1996, the International Court of
Justice called for nuclear disarmament obligation to be met); Sanders,
supra note ___ (in light of the U.N. Charter pledge ‘to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war”, the U.S. ‘failure to agree on
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation is a woeful foreboding that
conflicts will get worse not better.”). But see Hyman, supra note 105,
supra. (Since the end of the Cold War, more nations have given up
nuclear arsenals than have created new ones); id. (the nonproliferation
regime has not been as successful as advertised, since the vast majority
of states simply has no interest in doing what the N.D.T. prohibits).
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The reformist heavy lifting in this area was helped along by
an NGO: the Nobel Committee awarded the 2005 Peace Prize to
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its head,
Egyptian lawyer Mohamed El Baradei. This Prize was both a slap
at the U.S. and a warning that the serious threats posed by Khan,
North Korea, Iran, et al. can only be met through international
cooperation—rather than unilateral or collaborative action from
within the major players. (The U.S. had opposed El Baradei’s reelection because of his behavior concerning Iran, until it became
clear that there was no other suitable candidate; and the U.S. later
purported to find in his Nobel Prize a warning to Iran.)
Particularly innovative and deserving of global support is El
Baradei’s new proposal: countries which do not yet have nuclear
weapons should forbear producing nuclear fuel for at least ten
years. Fuel would be supplied (and disposed of later) by a country
already having nukes, with the IAEA as the supplier/disposer of
last resort. The IAEA seems to do its best work when given
unfettered access108—which is not the case in North Korea and
Iran, where various nation-state players claim primacy. The IAEA
could be understood as claiming a seat at the poker table, helping
to guide play in more ‘advanced’ (cooperative/positive-sum)
directions.
The World Summit Draft outcome document asked
governments to take action against organized crime, as well as
against the proliferation of small arms—“the real WMD”,
according to Mary Robinson109—and of land mines. 145 nations
have ratified the Landmine [non-proliferation] Treaty, the product
of the Campaign that won the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, and
108

Deen, supra note 37; David Holley, Nuclear Chief Offers a
Nonproliferation Plan: Promise Them Fuel, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005;
Despite Prize, Nuclear Agency Flawed, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 12, 2005;
Nuclear Watchdog Wins Nobel Peace Prize, AP, in INT. HERALD TRIB.,
Oct. 7, 2005; Short-Lived Celebration, supra note 53. But see Hymans,
supra note 105 (while the nonproliferation regime is billed as successful,
the fact is that most countries do not want the bomb in question anyway);
id. (the IAEA regime is “flimsy”, suffering from “ambiguous and
erratically enforced rules, a myriad of technical loopholes, and chronic
underfunding.”).
109
Robinson, supra note 72.
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performance under the Treaty has been relatively good. But
regrettably, the Pentagon may soon produce two higher-tech
landmines.110 To allow Annan the last word, the “nonproliferation regime” is “unraveling” because “we have allowed
posturing to get in the way of results.”111 (Posturing can be
understood as a relatively insubstantial poker bet, which is treated
as such by the other players.)
Administration—and a Sidebar.
Paul Volker, the head of the oil-for-food investigating
Commission, which convinced most U.N. members of the urgency
of administrative reform (sidebar, infra), found that SecretaryGeneral Annan’s “cumulative management performance” fell short
of the standard the U.N. “should strive to maintain.”112 The
putative keeper of the better natures at the U.N., Annan thus
continued his attempts to rebuild U.N. legitimacy, at a time when
his own political and moral authority was at its weakest. Many
problems stem from the U.N. bureaucrats’ inbred and cosseted (by
diplomatic immunity) existence. Bureaucratic positions are filled
by nationality rather than merit in an atmosphere of secrecy and
unaccountability, and many U.N. goals get compromised by a
bureaucratic unwillingness or inability to implement them. Except
for improved security measures, to forestall the recurrence of
events like the Baghdad explosion that killed Sergio de Mello and
other valued U.N. officials, Annan managed only partial reforms
before the World Summit. These earlier reforms nonetheless left
U.N. bureaucrats—most of whom have little faith in their
seniors—with their morale further damaged. The World Summit
(thus) approved Annan’s additional reforms, under his claimed
goals of improving U.N. integrity, impartiality, and its capacity to
deliver: an internal ethics office, especially to resolve conflict-ofinterest problems; strengthening the Office of Internal Oversight
110

Human Rights Watch, Back in Business?: U.S. Landmine Production
and Exports, Aug. 2005 (briefing paper, which can be downloaded from
<hrw.org>).
111
Hussain, supra note __ (quoting Annan). See Black, supra note 83.
112
Bill Berkowitz, At Sixty, It’s Uneasy Times for the U.N., I.P.S., Nov.
10, 2005 (quoting Volker).
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Services, and other auditing, etc. programs designed to increase
efficiency; a one-time buyout of the least competent U.N.
bureaucrats; an independent and external evaluation committee;
and increased uniformity over which documents are made public,
with a bias towards an increased transparency in the U.N.
Secretariat. These were the reforms the U.S. and other major
funders of the U.N. wanted, and they were adopted despite minor
players’ suspicions that they would be used by their advocates,
especially the U.S., to control the Secretary General. Developing
country worries were well-placed, to the extent that budgetary and
other major administrative controls are being removed from the
General Assembly that the developing countries dominate.113 This
looked like a straight zero-sum (not an ‘advanced’) poker game,
with developed (U.N.-funding) countries able to out-bid the
developing ones.
As mentioned earlier114, the oil-for-food sidebar provoked
shameless exaggeration of the extent of corruption, and of Annan’s
role in it, in a failed American neoconservative quest for the
Secretary-General’s head—because he approved of the S.C.’s
denial of permission for Iraqi War II. (Under this sidebar, Iraq was
permitted to circumvent the sanctions installed after Iraqi War I, by
selling oil in order to buy food and medicine). The Reports of the
Volker Commission investigating this sidebar also encouraged the
administrative reforms discussed in the last paragraph. These
Reports fault Annan for seeking administrative review of oil-forfood through the S.C., rather than an outside investigation of the
113

Brown, supra note 15; Chesterman, supra note 50; Deen, U.N.’s
Authority, supra note 84;
Mitchell, supra note 75; Mark Turner, Envoys Fight to Keep U.N.
Reform Package on Track, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005
(downloaded off <ft.com>); Nabal Toosi, Annan Defends Summit’s
Accomplishments, Agrees Some Results Mixed, A.P., Oct. 17, 2005, 3:15
P.M. E.D.T. (downloaded from <newsday.com>); Walker, supra note
49; Ward, Frechette, supra note 47; Key Elements of U.N. Draft
Document, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005; U.S. Fears Summit Will Gut U.N.
Reform, Rights Plan, Reuters, Sept. 12, 2005 (downloaded from
<AlertNet.com>). See Turner; Volker, supra note __ (quoting in note
115, infra; notes __ and accompanying text, infra (Group of 77’s
opposition after the Summit.
114
See note ___ and accompanying text, supra.
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scandal, and for not supervising his son Kojo—who profited from
the corruption and then proved uncooperative with the Volker
Commission. But U.S., French, British, Russian, and Chinese
representatives on the Security Council oversight committee
approved the relevant oil-for-food transfers, while turning a blind
eye to abuses. (Russia received one-third of the oil.) This
corruption pales in comparison with that of the U.S. Coalition
Provisional Authority in Iraq. Among other things, $12 billion was
withdrawn from the N.Y. Federal Reserve as 363 tons of $100
bills. 80% of another large disbursement could not be accounted
for. Fortunately, a neoconservative American attempt to find
corruption in U.N. tsunami funds, has gone nowhere.115
Saddam profited to the extent of $250-600 million per year,
including “kickbacks” from Volvo, Siemens, Daimler Chrysler,
Coastal Petroleum of Houston, and 2,400 other firms; and from the
sales of oil smuggled through Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. Neither
the kickbacks nor the smuggling was part of the U.N. oil-for-food
program, and U.S. and British intelligence had to know of the
smuggling—impossible to conceal from overflights and
satellites—and of the many diplomatic bags stuffed with cash that
moved in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, Annan accepted
responsibility for these scandals and the attendant design, auditing,
and management failures. But having mended his Washington
fences with all but the extremists, Annan then got outspoken
support from almost all U.N. members. This is appropriate:
differences among countries impeded supervision and operated to
tolerate corruption. What ensued were ‘unofficial’ poker games
among some nation-states, individuals (especially Saddam), and
115

Doreen Carvajal and Andrew Kramer, Report on Oil-for-Food
Scheme Gives Details of Bribes to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005;
Maggie Farley, U.N. Oil-for-Food Inquiry Findings Surprised Volker,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005; Colum Lynch, Oil-for-Food Probe: U.N.
Needs Overhaul to Stop Fraud, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 7, 2005, A20;
Lynch, U.N. Panel Says 2,400 Firms Paid Bribes to Iraq, WASHINGTON
POST, Oct. 28, 2005, A16; Mark Turner, Volker Set to Call for Reform of
U.N. Leadership, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, 21; 51; Walker, supra
note 49; Ian Williams, The Sound of Silence: As in Dogs Not Barking,
Maximsnews.com, Dec. 30, 2005.
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corporations shamelessly devoted to making of money at the
expense of dishonoring U.N. ideals and eroding the public’s
support for them. No one was in charge (a hallmark of poker) and
no one emerged covered in glory.116
Interrelated (?) Human Rights and Development
In a thoughtful article, Philip Alston argues that
development and human rights advocates should pay much more
attention to each other’s concerns, which are linked by a “virtual
tautology”: the “U.N. approach of indivisibility”117 that arguably
informs the entire reform effort. Human rights and development
advocates should “engage more effectively”, share their
“imagination and energy”, “prioritize” between themselves, reduce
the gap between rhetoric and actual programs that both groups
share, and work to increase the capacities of “duty-bearers” to
meet obligations and of “rights-holders” to claim the fruits of these
obligations.118 Mary Robinson calls extreme poverty the most
serious form of human rights violation, especially given the ways
poor countries use their scarce resources119—in no small measure
because of strictures imposed by the IMF, the World Bank, and
private foreign investors and lenders. Unfortunately, the poker
metaphor predicts Alston’s conclusion—human rights and
development advocates are “ships passing in the night:”120
116

Lynch, U.N. Panel, supra note 115; David Lynch, Report Details
Kickbacks for Iraq, USA TODAY, Oct, 27, 2005, 12:30 A.M.; Walker,
supra note 49; Probe Finds Illicit, Unethical Corrupt Oil-for-Food
Operation, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 2005, 12:55 A.M. See Turner, Volker,
supra note ___ (quoting Mark Malloch Brown) (“Entrenched interests
inside the organization” the U.N., “a wish that all of this would go away
and that it could settle back into comfortable mediocrity again.”).
117
Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the
Human Rights and Development Seen Through the Lens of the
Millennium Development Goals, 27 H. RT. Q., 755, 784-85 (2005). See
Security Council Meeting, supra note 86 (quoting French P.M.
deVillepin) (calling for “resolute action” at the World Summit “on
everything that fuels terrorism—the inequalities, the persistence of
violence, injustices and conflicts, the lack of understanding among
cultures,” since force “does not address the roots of evil.”).
118
Alston, supra note 117, at 755-56, 770, 790.
119
Id. at 786-87 (quoting Robinson).
120
Id. at 825.
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different players in different games are pursuing different gains in
different ways, forestalling what is perhaps Secretary-General
Annan’s mega-‘advanced poker’ of cooperation and coordination
in pursuit of security as well as human rights and development.
Human rights may be “open-ended, contingent and …
subjective,”121 but they are much less so than the World Summit’s
treatment of them. They were potentially improved as an ancillary
effect of establishing the Peacebuilding Commission, and of
creating the “responsibility to protect” against genocide or war
crimes. On the other hand, human rights were seriously damaged
by the lack of progress over non-proliferation and implementation
of the Millennium Development Goals (infra), and slightly injured
by the (slight, it turned out) emphasis on terrorism. SecretaryGeneral Annan had called for reform of the Human Rights
Commission into the “third pillar” of the U.N. (along with the
General Assembly and the Security Council) because of that
Commission’s “declining credibility and professionalism.”122 The
reformed body should operate continuously, rather than the current
six weeks per year term that is conducive only to grand but
superficial gestures; given more time, effective monitoring of
countries’ human rights undertakings would be possible. Also,
membership in the body should be reserved to countries making
real contributions to human rights.123
In 2004, the Human Rights Commission refused to act over
abuses by China, Iran or Zimbabwe, or by Russia in Chechnya.
Chaired by Libya, the 2004Commission had Zimbabwe as a
member and re-elected Sudan during its Darfur abuses, having
earlier refused to re-elect the U.S. (This reminds me of Lyndon
Johnson’s response to criticism over appointing Admiral Hyman
Rickover to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: “Wouldn’t you
rather have him inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent
pissing in?”) This re-election failure of the U.S. attracted the
enmity of neoconservatives, and the apparent top priority of the
121

Id. at 760.
Human Rights Watch, U.N. Reform Q and A (n.d.) (downloaded
from <hrw.org>) (quoting Annan) (hereinafter Q & A]. See Brown,
supra note 15; Q & A; Security Council Meeting, supra note 86 (quoting
deVillepin in note 105, supra).
123
Q & A, supra note 122 (quoting Annan).
122
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Bush Administration during the World Summit was to punish a
Commission showing this much independence—by destroying it.
The Commission repaid this favor by appointing eight independent
human rights experts aggressively to evaluate the rights record of
the U.S. over the past five years—as part of the Commission’s
regular evaluation cycle. Investigated are the worldwide treatment
of ‘terrorist’ detainees, the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act and the copycat
laws it spawns worldwide, the Iraqi tribunal trying Saddam and his
colleagues, the death penalty, and other shortcomings. Admission
of the U.N. experts to U.S. prisons in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Guantanamo has been denied by the U.S. The Mickeljohn Civil
Liberties Institute at Berkeley documented 180 alleged human
rights violations by the U.S., and 19 alleged violations of human
rights duties by the federal government.124
The World Summit missed an important reform
opportunity, by referring key decisions about a Human Rights
Council (to replace the Commission) to the General Assembly
(G.A.) for action. This move was supported by Russia, China,
Egypt, Pakistan, and some other countries concerned about their
human rights record. Only the Summit’s doubling of the budget
for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (the
capable Louise Arbour is the current High Commissioner) is
regarded as adding (a minimal) content to reform. It seems clear
that opposition to making human rights protections more effective
among three of the four major players left the matter all-butunreformed within the fifth major player. Some criticized the U.S.
for trying to remove from the Commission countries hostile to U.S.
interests, and for U.S. support of some human rights-abusing
124

supra note110; Thalif Deen, U.N./Human Rights Body to Scrutinize
U.S. Abuses, I.P.S., Sept. 20, 2005. See Hughes, supra note __ (quoting
language from Bush’s World Summit speech which echoes some of
Annan’s ideas); La Franchi, supra note 101 (quoting John Norris, of the
International Crisis Group) (recent human rights progress through
“international actions against high-profile violators like Serbia’s
Slobodan Milosevic or Liberia’s Charles Taylor); U.N. Envoy Cautions
on China Rights, BBC News, Sept. 12, 2005 (Louise Arbour, text
accompanying note __, infra, concerned about China’s detaining
journalists, labor activists, and ethnic minorities, and about the treatment
of Tibetans and Muslim neighbors).
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regimes, but an E.U. official called the new Council “a simple
name-change.”125 Trying to put a brave face on this non-reform,
Mark Malloch Brown said that the new Council offered reform
leverage within the G.A., for countries that really care about
human rights. Activists’ calls for a human rights court (like that of
the E.U., rather than a Commission or Council), or for a court
combining this function with the International Court of Justice and
the International Criminal Court, are unlikely to go anywhere for
some time to come.126
******
Lack of progress on development during the September
2005 World Summit, and the failure effectively to plan
implementation of the Millennium Development Goals in
particular, is perhaps the clearest illustration this article offers of
how something like a (cooperative, positive-sum) ‘advanced
poker’ can give way under the lure of possibly winning smaller
gains more quickly in zero- sum, ordinary poker ways. At first
glance, this is because of the limited altruism displayed by most
developed countries; Canada, Holland, and the Scandinavian
countries are worthy exceptions. This altruism is mostly exhausted
on the plight of fellow-citizens rather than on far-away
‘strangers’—unless the foreigners’ are victimized by some
mediagenic disaster perhaps. Also, middle-income countries like
India and Brazil can expect little in the way of increased
development aid and are, rather, worried about tougher human
rights standards and a dilution of their influence at the U.N.
125

Evelyn Leopold & Paul Taylor, U.N. Assembly Approves Weekend
Summit Blueprint, WASHINGTON POST, Reuters, Sept. 13, 2005, 7:52
P.M. (quoting Benita Ferrero-Waldner). See Power, supra note 51;
Deen, U.N. Human Rights, supra note 124; id. (quoting Norman
Solomon, of the D.C. Institute for Public Accuracy) (the U.S. “is among
the most culpable of human rights violators”); id. (“A superpower that is
striving to remake” the U.N. “in its own image can hardly be expected to
submit to institutional scrutiny of its actual human rights record.”);
Hussain, supra note __; Evelyn Leopold, U.S. Fears Summit Will Get
U.N. Reform Rights Plan, REUTERS ALERT NET, Sept. 12, 2005, 18:42
GMT; Haider Rizvi, supra note 65; Mark Turner, Envoys Fight to Keep
UN Reform Package on Track, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, 03:00.
126
Brown, supra note 15; Human Rights Watch, Key Human Rights
Proposals Stymied, Sept. 13, 2005.
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International law thus continues to honor voluntary redistributions
(by aid “donors”, perhaps through what are called M.D.G.
“development compacts”) but almost never creates a legal
obligation of redistribution.127 Such an obligation could be
imposed as a matter of developed country status rather than
contract, but it would be almost impossible to enforce this
obligation under governance without a government, or to
determine the relative rights and obligations of middle-income
countries.
Unfortunately, this international law and practice of a
voluntary and thus limited altruism is badly out of step with a wellinformed reality. While development is a “public good”: initially,
a perception which encourages many developed countries to be
“free riders” who reap diffuse benefits without bearing focused
127

Alston, supra note 117, at 777, 786, 825; Posner, supra note 8;
Turner, 13. For example, an $88 million U.N. appeal concerning
starvation caused by draught in Malawi, contemporaneous with the
World Summit, attracted government pledges after three weeks, where
$1/day would save a life. Malawi Appeal Gets _____, BBC _____.
Similarly, the 2005 aid shortfall at the U.N. High Commission for
Refugees and the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) is $219 million and
$182 million respectively. African Refugees, ___________.
Developed countries spend more in a week to subsidize their own
farmers than they spend in a year to help starving children. U.N. Warns
______. The WFP requested bids from the ten largest reinsurance
companies, in a pilot scheme to insure Ethiopia against draught. Mark
Turner, U.N. Move to Insure Against Drought, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct.
15, 2005, 03:00. (Such insurance is necessary only because of limited
altruism, since a global self-insurance by all of us would save much
money in terms of reinsurance company profits.) In contrast, a proposed
insurance fund for foreign investors in Gaza (Kessler, supra note 23)
makes sense regardless of altruism, since this bind of private-sector
insurance is commonly thought essential to investment in developing
countries and commonly arranged through a division of the World Bank.
But see also Linus Atarak, World Bank Chief Says Africa is First
Priority, I.P.S., (quoting Wolfowitz) (discussing developed countries
“obligation” to help developing countries without describing how the
obligation can be enforced); id. (“uncomfortable” for developing
countries to give up subsidies during Doha negotiations, but this is far
less serious than the “daily … deprivation” these subsidies generate
among “the poorest.”).
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costs , development also spawns significant benefits which can
be directly appropriated by individuals, NGOs, and developing and
developed countries in the long run. Development results in more
goods and services being produced, traded, and consumed of
course; and also in a greater citizen tolerance, a willingness to
settle disputes peacefully (especially if good rules and courts are in
place), a democratic inclination, and the greater energy and
happiness that flow from improving living standards. After all,
this is the promise of modernism, Max Weber’s for example,
which is why post-modernism is unpopular in the Third World:
people there want to experience extensive material benefits before
feeling “alienated” from them. (In contrast, economic stagnation
or decline is conducive to frustration, friction and, sometimes,
ethnic strife, authoritarianism, and a swelling of terrorist ranks.)
From this perspective, two central developmental problems
remain: Western politics has an overwhelmingly short-term
orientation which is ill-suited to development issues, an orientation
marked by two- and four-year election cycles in the U.S. for
example; and large gaps in the agendas and priorities among
countries result in too little of the cooperation essential to a
sustained ‘advanced poker.’129 Such gaps spawned what South
Africa’s Mbeki termed a “half-hearted, timid, and tepid” World
Summit130, and also paralysis and apparent deadlock (as of this
writing) in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, and widespread
dissatisfaction with the (anti-) developmental behavior of the IMF
and the World Bank. The remedy proposed later is a
reinvigoration of the rules of liberal internationalism, to further
128

At the World Summit, the Presidents of China and Indonesia
stressed the importance of a global cooperation, without which
development efforts are bound to fail. GA/10381. (Cooperation with
people otherwise excluded from the development process is particularly
important to success. Arndt. See notes ____ and accompanying text,
supra.
129
BENJAMIN FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH (2005); Shiffer & Hakim, Why the Rich Must Get Richer, THE
ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 2005, 87.
130
South Africa’s Mbeki (discussing the lack of resources for the poor
to extricate themselves from misery and the related need for developed
countries to go beyond traditional definitions of “security.”
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embed a global ‘advanced poker’ through a mature understanding
of our long-term interests and needs.131
The Millennium Development Goals (M.D.G.s; see the
Appendix) were to be the focus of the September 2005 World
Summit, accounting as they did for half of the Summit draft (prenegotiations) outcome document. Secretary-General Annan
observed that “[n]ations must tear down the walls that separated
the developed and developing world,”132 and Roger Coate speaks
of a “system-wide initiative to raise people out of hell-like
conditions.”133 Helen Tombo and Kevin Watkins discuss the
reality of a global inequality: 2.5 billion people currently live on
less than $2 per day, with 1.2 billion of these living at a lower
“poverty” level.134 Projections indicate that 800 million will still
live in poverty in 2015 (the anticipated end of the M.D.G. process),
380 million more than the relevant M.D.G. Target stipulates. In
2005, we are five years into the twenty year M.D.G. process, and
50 countries (900 million people) already make little or no
progress toward one or more M.D.G. targets, a lag which
undermines progress in meeting the other targets. The projected
non-attainment of another Target by 2015 means that an additional
41 million children will die needlessly; a child currently dies every
three seconds, a mother dies every minute during childbirth, and
25,000 people die from starvation every day. More than one
billion people lack access to a safe water supply, and 2.6 billion

131

See notes ___ and accompanying text, infra.
Sixteenth General Assembly Plenary, United Nations General
Assembly, World Leaders at General Assembly Summit Urged to
Persevere, Take Bold Steps to Tackle Urgent Challenges, As Lives of
Millions Hang in the Balance, (GA/10379) (quoting Annan).
133
Coate, supra note 1.
134
Helen Tombo, Global Call to Action Against Poverty, _____; Isaac
Baker, Time for a “Decisive Breakthrough, UN Urges, IPS, Sept. 7,
2005; United Natnins Development Programme Bulletin, More Aid, ProPoor Trade Reform, and Long-Term Peace-Building Vital to Ending
Extreme Poverty, MDG, Sept. 7, 2005 (quoting Kevin Watkins, a lead
author of the 2005 UNDP Human Development Report).
132
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lack access to sanitation, yet rich countries give half as much
development aid (in real terms) as they gave in 1960.135
A significant departure from previous approaches to
development, the M.D.G.s captured the imagination and energy of
international agencies, developing countries, and NGOs.
Mobilization of these organizations is sought to generate national
reports that describe development priorities—many of the reports
already drafted make no reference to human rights—and also
voluntary “development compacts” between a developing country
and developed countries. Transparency and a great deal of
publicity are thought essential to keeping the countries and
organizations’ feet to the developmental fire, but coverage of the
M.D.G. process by mainstream media has been disappointing so
far.136
Conflicts over development priorities and techniques
emerged soon after the consensus (‘advanced poker’) promulgation
of the M.D.G.s in 2000. A few countries, led by the U.S., continue
to advocate the “free-market model” of ‘development’ (really, the
pursuit of economic growth) that reigned in the 1990s, after the
demise of many communist party-states and the erosion of the
means to finance “welfare” measures in social democracies.
(Family planning was deleted from the M.D.G.s prior to their
promulgation, to appease American neoconservatives and the
Vatican, despite the essential role of population control in attaining
M.D.G. targets among the least developed countries.) In contrast,
many developed and almost all developing countries pursue goals
which are ignored de facto by markets and their advocates: rather
modestly redressing inequalities in favor of the poor and
powerless, and forestalling the economic instabilities characteristic
of an unregulated capitalism—particularly the “premature”
marketization that the IMF and the World Bank demand from
developing countries (infra). The U.S. thus winds up pursuing free
trade at the expense of generous development aid (aid supplied
subject to conditions which make the relatively small sums less
135

Tombo, supra note 134, 124 supra note ___; Baker, supra note 134.
See Penderio (quoting a WHO official, the shortfall in achieving M.D.G.
health targets to date is “staggering.”).
136
Alston, supra note 117, at 756, 777, 780, 786; Diana Cariboni,
Poverty Missing From the News Agenda, I.P.S., Nov. 22, 2005.
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effective), while the E.U. supports relatively generous aid at the
expense of a potentially more valuable free trade—especially in
agriculture. Russia and China (the other major players) passively
support the developmental strategy of the majority, while the
World Bank now speaks of an oxymoronic “market-driven
equality.”137
137

See Chemillier-Gendreau, The Alternative U.N., supra note 65;
Shirin, World Bank Calls for Market-Driven Equality, IPS, Sept. 20,
2005; Marcela Valente, Civil Society Forum-A Sham?, IPS, Sept. 9,
2005; Deen, Family; Stephen King. There is too little development
aid—adjusted for inflation, it has not increased yet. African countries
are dependent on it—agriculture has been neglected recently, too much
aid is absorbed by consultants from the donor country, and effectiveness
is reduced by the overlaps created by a failure to coordinate donors’
programs. Dugger, supra note ___; Sachs at 7; The Foreign Aid Gap.
Even the U.S. HIV/AIDS program is bilateral and channels funds
according to U.S. strategic interests.
Free trade maximizes output from given inputs, but says nothing
about the distribution of that output. Stephen King. According to the
World Bank’s Wolfowitz, “inequity” most often happens when markets
are missing, imperfect or failing. But the M.D.G.s are driven by the idea
that lack of development does not flow from a lack of trade, but from a
lack of capital and geographic, political or technological constraints,
King. According to Social Watch, the resulting poverty stems from an
inequality of access to income, power, job opportunities, information,
social services, and political participation. This amounts to Amartya
Sen’s deprivation of basic capabilities, measurable under the Social
Watch Index: the proportion of births attended by skilled health
personnel, the under-5 infant mortality rate (which grows worse in 56
countries), and the proportion of children in school through the fifth
grade. Cariboni.
Martin Ravallian, Inequality Is Bad for the Poor, World Bank
Research Paper 4677 (Aug. 2005): Economic growth and trade are
distribution-neutral, often inequality-promoting, and thus they have less
of the “welfare impact” associated with development. Care must be used
in deplacing poverty reduction (rather than inequalities reduction as
such) programs, lest redistributive policies inhibit growth and create
additional economic distortions.” “Win-win policies” are the solution,
policies that eliminate inhibitions on growth which are also serve to
increase inequalities. E.g.s are, fixing market and government failures,
making institutions work better, improved infrastructures, and a better
delivery of quality health and education which is more responsive to the
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The World Summit M.D.G. outcome was spotty, but with
an overall lack of progress in solving the collective action
problems of development. Optimists’ hopes that the M.D.G.
process would rejuvenate multilateral behavior were thus
dashed.138 Mary Robinson concludes that the M.D.G.s “now seem
needs of the poor. Id. Inequality is the root cause of poverty in Latin
America, Osara. The halving of extreme poverty (M.D.G. Target 1) by
2015 is unlikely in Brazil or Argentina, and attention to poverty occurs
only through the election of progressive governments, id. See World
Bank Calls for Market-Driven Economy, IPS, Sept. 21, 2005, 03:28
GMT (quoting Rick Rowden) (equality cannot come about through
market-based privatization policies or without eliminating a gender-bias;
Macon-Maskor (citing a recent ILO study about the growing
“employment gap”, “jobless growth” in ‘booming Asian economies that
increasingly underfund public heath); Tranovich (women are more likely
to work in the “informal” sector, in the most precarious jobs with the
lowest wages). A term growing in popularity is “equity”: a move
towards equality. It amounts to “empty rhetoric conserving a regressive
status quo”, without changes in institutions which allocate resources and
economic opportunities. Equity Promises.
138
Paul Martin & Soraka Iyer of the Third World Network argues that
the World Summit shows that world leaders are “isolated from … global
poverty” and “appear … immune” to “mass mobilizations.” Deen,
supra note 69. The Director of the U.N.’s Millennium Campaign, Salil
Shetty, fears that the 2015 M.D.G. targets won’t be met as a whole, “not
even in 100 years.” World Must Act to Alleviate Crippling Debt and
Rampant Poverty, Leaders Tell U.N. Summit, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, Sept.
15, 2005 (Progress on meeting Target 1, halving poverty, is relatively
good but “masks huge disparities across and within countries and
regions”, and the low or inappropriate quality of aid, id. This admitted
progress on Target 1 is actually small in comparison with the global
availability of human, financial, and technical resources. Baker, supra
note #124 and #128, citing the 2005 UNDP Human Development Report.
Hussain, supra note ___: thus was the original purpose of the Summit
subordinated to political and security interests. See NGO (to the same
effect). However, the Summit “clearly created stronger support” for
developed countries contributing 0.7% of their GNP for development
aid, created innovative means of financing: e.g., a small tax on airline
tickets. Deen, Lost-Sum. The World Summit outcome document did
declare that gender equality, HIV/AIDS, and reproductive health must be
kept at the top of the global agenda. Deen, Giant. The Summit also set
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set to join the pile of broken pledges that mark the old U.N.’s
history.”139 The Summit also ratified an earlier move by the
wealthy G8 countries, which then received additional ratifications
from International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB)
meetings. After eight years of popular campaigning, through rock
concerts, etc., the G8 agreed to $40-55 billion in debt relief for the
twenty poorest countries. This number would go as high as 38
countries, but Kenya for example is deemed to have a
“sustainable” debt burden. The G8 action can be regarded as a
follow-up on previous ‘advanced poker’ rounds of winning a
partial debt forgiveness for the poorest countries, even though such
steps violate the IMF’s “uniformity of treatment” rule. Nothing
was done about the fair amount of this debt that was used corruptly
to finance elite lifestyles in the poorest countries, or about the
economists’ “moral hazard” for the future: having had past debts
forgiven, elites are likely to create new debt and use it
inappropriately, in the expectation that the new debt will be
forgiven as well.140 Instead of simply forgiving it, the debt could
have been (but wasn’t) converted into supervised programs to
finance the pursuit of M.D.G. targets. G8 countries will likely
debit this debt relief from the development aid they otherwise
intend to give and, only one month after the Summit, at a WB
meeting, they fell to quarreling (reverted to an ordinary, 0-sum
poker) over who pays what, who is eligible for relief, and which
conditions will be attached. Belgium, Holland, and Norway fear
that the costs of this debt abatement will not be fully funded by the
G8, leaving the IMF and the WB with too little income to
function.141 In other words, these international organizations

up an International Financing Facility, to make development aid more
predictable and accessible. #24; 2005 World.
139
Robinson, supra note 72.
140
Posner, supra note 8. See notes #94; #100; #132; Bad Loans. The
G8 countries are Russia, Britain, France, Germany, the U.S., Japan, Italy
and Canada. Philip Thornton, Rich Nations Finally Give Go-Ahead to
Long-Awaited Agreement on Debt Relief, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 27,
2005.
141
See supra note 140; Atara, supra note 127.
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“swapped the risk that poor countries will not repay their loans for
the risk that rich countries will not redeem their promises.”142
Many in the Third World would find a mixed blessing
(rather than, say, a disaster) in the IMF and the WB having too
little income to function. Developing countries see their underrepresentation in these international agencies as diminishing
agency significance, and as fueling the need to circumvent them
through, e.g., the G8 assumed to be more sympathetic—even
though developing countries have no formal representation there.
Strict IMF and WB policies are seen to curb development and
democracy: politicians and bureaucrats must respond to these
organizations’ strictures rather than to local electorates. An NGO
study shows that, of the 308 IMF and WB policies imposed on
fifty countries, only eleven policies diverged from the
“Washington [Reaganite, neoclassical economics] consensus” of
strict monetary and fiscal policies, deregulation and privatization,
and the premature opening to an international competition of
capital, financial, labor, and product markets in developing
countries.143
Large WB projects in developing countries are bonanzas
for multinational corporations and corrupt local politicians, but
they do little for the poor—other than evict them from subsistence
lands. More than 70% of WB loans go to as few as twelve middleincome countries, countries able to meet their capital needs
through private markets. This pattern is likely to continue—with
WB President Wolfowitz recently touting a mega-project to supply
electricity to Congo, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and South Africa—
despite the consensus that small projects better meet the needs of
the poor, especially in water and energy and especially if the
projects are made accountable to their ostensible beneficiaries.
Like his predecessor, Wolfowitz pays lip-service to such projects
and virtues. A Dutch M.P. notes that parliamentarians must inform
themselves and apply extra pressure to countries and the WB—so
as to keep their games honest. The story is much the same for the
IMF. Asian countries have accumulated huge foreign exchange
142

Bad Loans, supra note 140.
World Bank/IMF Losing Relevency, South Says, I.P.S., Sept. 23,
2005; Sanjay Suri, Straight Talk Expected at Post-Helsinki Roundtables,
I.P.S., Sept. 12, 2005 (Schifferes).
143
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reserves, in part so they don’t have to go begging to the IMF.
Argentina defaulted and otherwise took a hard line against the IMF
and private creditors, yet this resulted in only a three-month
depression. Argentina amounted to a huge loss of IMF influence, a
bluff well and truly called on the cut-down-to-size IMF leader of a
“creditors’ cartel” of other multilateral creditors, rich countries,
and the private sector. The Group of 20 (G20) rich and developing
countries describes the need for the IMF to improve governance,
strategy, and operations, and to reform their quotas (which govern
particular countries’ capacity to borrow.) The IMF seems to
understand the need to increase its legitimacy through such
reforms, plus expanding developing country influence in the IMF,
introducing transparency, and forbearing from attaching stabilityand development-endangering conditions to IMF loans.144 We
shall see.
The legally-guaranteed separatism of the IMF and the WB,
which are accountable (pro rata) to the countries providing loan
funds, and of the World Trade Organization (WTO), accountable
to its 148 members, means that global development policies are not
integrated or coordinated by the Secretary General, the World
Summit, or anyone else. The Doha Round of the WTO
negotiations (lodged in quasi-authoritarian Qatar, to minimize antiWTO demonstrations) has regularly been on the brink of collapse
since 2003, with too much finger-pointing (insignificant bets,
perceived as such) and too little leadership (as the poker metaphor
leads us to expect). Doha is the first real chance for developing
countries to engage in trade negotiations that might enhance their
economic growth, reductions in poverty145, and perhaps curb some
of the market fundamentalisms of the previous, Uruguay Round.
Three main ‘games’ are being played separately and
together in Doha, inconclusively and over long periods: (1)
liberalizing farm trade, the most distorted of global trade sectors;
(2) liberalizing trade in services, chiefly in the banking, medical,
and accounting sub-sectors; and (3) decreasing industrial tariffs,
144

Atara, supra note 127; Balls and McGregor; Hart & Pottinger;
Lachman; Schifferes, supra note ___; Weisbrodt; G20 Nations.
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Farmer’s Friend; In the Rough. See Martinez (as of Oct. 2005, the
Doha process is already two years behind schedule).

[VOL. XX:XXX]

62
(NAME OF JOURNAL)

measures which the E.U. in particular is keen for developing
countries to implement. These seem to be negative-sum poker
games: meager winnings by developed countries do not seem to
wash their losses, while developing countries are hanging in there
as of this writing, but with their betting resources dissipated. The
clearest example of an ordinary poker occurs in negotiations over
liberalizing trade in services. These have led to decentralized
results, with different countries betting on different deals in what
amounts to separate games. This would also be the outcome from
a total collapse of the Doha Round, with rich countries able to pick
off poor ones one-by-one (i.e., “bet” more than poor countries can
afford to “call”) while creating bilateral trade treaties. ‘Advanced
poker’ is structured to avoid such a collapse and thereby stay
within the broader Doha “game” geared toward fairer and more
broadly acceptable rules (rather than a simple Uruguay Round rush
to further liberalizations), if the poorer countries can only find their
way back to this ‘advanced poker.’ The apparent Doha deadline is
mid-2007, when President Bush’s “fast track” authority ends: i.e.,
the Senate must vote to ratify the Doha agreement or not until mid2007, without introducing protectionist amendments that favor
particular constituents.146
Middle-income countries like Brazil and India refuse to
budge on (2) services, and especially on (3) industrial tariffs,
where they want to protect fragile local industries, absent
significant progress on (1), their access to the agricultural markets
of developed countries. Annual farm subsidies amount to $19
billion in the U.S. and $75 billion in the E.U. (with protectionist
Japan hiding behind these major players), locally-popular barriers
which are difficult for agricultural products from poor, developing,
and even middle-income countries to leap over. The U.S. bet
146

See Ragavan, In The Rough, supra note ___; The Trade Game (using
two party, one issue game, discussed in notes ___ and accompanying
text, supra, to model the Doha Round). The WB estimates the (scaledback) benefit of a successful Doha Round to developing countries at $2030 billion per year. But see also Arndt, supra note ___ (one study shows
projected benefits and adjustment costs to be relatively small in
Mozambique); Filo & Harridge (a successful Doha’s “positive but rather
small” effects on the structure of poverty and income distribution in
Brazil).
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significant farm subsidy reductions in an ostensible attempt to
break the Doha gaming deadlock, but the E.U. (and especially
France) refuses to match (or “call”) the U.S. bet. The U.S. can
thus be said to have “called” the E.U.’s “bluff” over development
being a “core” value (or source of prestige) within E.U. foreign
policy. But it is widely known that Congress is unlikely to
underwrite the U.S. Trade Representative’s bet. It is even reported
that the 32 poorest WTO members have had trouble agreeing on a
common position, despite their not being required to make
concessions during negotiations.147
At the December 2005 Hong Kong Summit, expectations
were low that a meaningful framework agreement for the Doha
Round would be created. Philip Bowring gave this Summit a low
but not failing grade, since it showed developing countries to be
more dedicated trade liberalizers than are their developed
counterparts.148 NGOs like Oxfam and Greenpeace were very
critical, and the behavior of demonstrators—mostly South Korean
farmers—was mirrored inside the hall by E.U. representatives.
110 developing countries united in a historic first for the WTO, in
an effort to make the Round the development round it was
supposed to be. Their efforts failed, since no meaningful access to
the agricultural markets of developing countries resulted.
Developed countries agreed to eliminate agricultural export
subsidies by 2013 (by 2006 for cotton), but export subsidies are a
small fraction of total U.S./E.U. farm subsidies. Their quotas and
tariffs will be done away with in 2008 for the 50 least developed
countries, but the U.S. has already said that it will likely exempt
147

Beattie, Poorer; Bianchi, E.U. Lender; French Monkey (France has
bullied E.U. partners into a “trade cowardice”); id. (Does France want
the “unilateralist” blame for entrenching poverty?); Stopped Clock. See
Beattie, Ct; The Trade Game, supra note __. The existing WTO
Agreement on Agriculture has Special safeguards provisions (special
import restrictions for certain types of “emergencies”) which developing
countries would like to prohibit developed countries from using.
148
Philip Bowring, Silver Lining in WTO Talks, INT. HERALD TRIB.,
Dec. 19, 2005. See Don Lee, Delegates Eke Out a Trade Deal, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005 (a Hong Kong failure would have damaged WTO
credibility while it contends with the proliferation of bilateral trade
agreements, growing global economic imbalances, and growing
protectionist sentiment in developed countries).
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textiles and apparel from this abolition. Developing countries hope
to recover ground lost in Hong Kong by influencing drafting
committees and entering into plurilateral negotiations over
agreements on agricultural market access—with services as the
new battleground of negotiation.149
To provide counterpoint to this Doha/Hong Kong quasianarchy, and to round out the picture of multilateral development
efforts, the World Summit also called for the reform of the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and implementation of
the Hyogo Framework to reduce disaster relief response times,
improve disaster prevention measures and early warning systems,
and secure more food supplies for disasters which are less tied to
donors’ conditions. The global response to the South Pacific
tsunami seemed adequate, with the U.N. playing an important but
far from exclusive role because the U.S., Australia, and a few
others doubted U.N. efficiency, but hurricanes in Central and
South America, famine in Niger, and the earthquake in Kashmir
illustrate donor inattention and “fatigue”, and a shortage of U.N.
resources. Such disasters will negate development efforts in
affected countries for many years to come, unless creative
programs and a great deal of money are forthcoming. The new
High-Level Commission for the Legal Empowerment of the Poor,
apparently not considered by the World Summit, has Hernando de
Soto and Madeline Albright as co-Commissioners. It is likely to
not be a mere substitute for doing something: de Soto’s legallydefined property rights ‘movement’ is increasingly accepted as the
best means of transition from an informal economy and into a
measure of entrepreneurship. There is currently $9.3 trillion worth
of unregistered land and equipment worldwide, which can be
levered into additional wealth, security for loans, etc., through
registration and the other means that the Commission will
consider.150
149

Id.; Gustavo Capdevila, Back to Work in the WTO, With Empty
Hands, I.P.S., Dec. 30, 2005; Lee, supra note 148; Ramesh Jaura,
Historic Union in Hong Kong, I.P.S., Dec. 16, 2005. See id.: (The 50
least developed countries, 34 of which are in Africa, hold 12.5% of
world population but account for only 0.5% of world trade).
150
Chaufen; U.N. Calls. The U.N.’s emergency relief coordinator, Jan
Egeland, proposes additional reforms: a central fund (to which the U.S.
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The Games Continue
In the wake of the World Summit, the new General
Assembly (G.A.) President, Eliasson of Sweden, said members
were busy mapping negotiating positions (as you might expect,
structuring new poker games in effect), and dealing with matters
that take precedence: setting up the Peacebuilding Commission and
the Human Rights Council that must be in place by the end of
2005[!], and with a terrorism convention to be finished by the end
of the current G.A. session in September 2006. The crucial
definition of “terrorism” continues to be contentious, with some
members continuing their efforts to protect the rights of selfdetermination and to resist occupation that some opponents see as
“terrorism” among, e.g., Palestinians. In late November, a speech
by U.S. Ambassador Bolton gave the U.N. “its usual warning”
from the U.S.: ‘Do what we say or we will send you into
oblivion.’151 Annan’s comment is “I am not the interpreter of
Ambassador Bolton”, and an American reader of the Bolton-ian tea
leaves sees the U.S. continuing to seek “multilateral cover for
unilateral and illegal U.S. interventions….”152 As 2005 drew to a
will not contribute) and other ways to leave relief less “overstretched.”
Imogen Foulkes, U.N. Urges Disaster Response Reform, BBC NEWS,
Nov. 23, 2005, 01:33 GMT.
151

Thalif Deen, U.N. Faces New Political Threats From the U.S., I.P.S.,
Nov. 23, 2005 (quoting Global Policy Forum’s Jim Paul, who apparently
paraphrases Bolton).
152
Id. (quoting Annan and Institute for Policy Studies’ Phyllis Bennis
respectively). See General Assembly President Outlines Progress on
U.N. World Summit Issues, U.N. NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 17, 2005 (read off
<un.org/news>) (quoting and citing Eliasson). The U.S. seeks to
disempower the G.A. and make Annan’s successors accountable to
Washington as “glorified CEOs”. Deen, U.N. Faces, supra note 151
(quoting Bennis and Paul). Many of the Secretary-General’s top staff
has been replaced by active supporters of the U.S. agenda, but Annan has
retained some independence nonetheless. Id. (quoting Bennis). The net
effect is more belligerent but otherwise not very different from Clinton’s
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close, the U.N. could not approve its 2006-07 budget because of
the implicit U.S. threat to withhold funds if members do not enact
the “radical” reforms the U.S. seeks, especially in administration.
(The occurred after the U.S. was rather disengaged from the
September World Summit that created so much “fudge and
mush.”) Jeffrey Laurenti attributes this stance to Bush’s “foreign
policy schizophrenia”, also termed his “bipolar” isolationism.153
The Group of 77, discussed in the next paragraph, refused to rush
into decision under threats from U.S. neoconservatives, taking the
position that later reforms can be paid for under supplementary
budgets. This led Bolton, that comfortable contrarian who
reportedly “speak{s} power to truth,”154 to propose a three-month
budget, and that the U.S. could and would solve global problems
by turning to mechanisms other than the U.N.’s. A two-year
budget was approved unanimously late in December, with a
spending cap (backed by the U.S., the E.U., and Japan), that runs
out in about six months unless reforms are adopted, reforms which
Annan would restrict to those passed by the September World
Summit.155
From the other side, the 132-member Group of 77
developing countries, plus China, is holding up work on the
Human Rights Council (along with a smaller group of repressive
regimes which fear being called to account) because Bolton wants
“assertive multilateralism”, where Madeline Albright famously called the
U.N. “a tool of American foreign policy.” Id. (quoting Bennis).
153
Jeffrey Laurenti, Schizophrenic Administration Heightens U.S.
Isolation, MAXIMS NEWS NETWORK, Dec. 29, 2005.
154
Id.
155
Thalif Deen, U.N. Threatened With Budgetary Showdown, I.P.S.,
Dec. 21, 2005; Maggie Farley, U.N. Hit By a Bolt From the Right, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005; Warren Hoge, Official Says American Delay of
U.N. Budget Would Cause Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005; Edith
Lederer, U.S. Stands Alone in the U.N. Budget Demand, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Dec. 2, 2005, 7:03 P.M.; Laurenti, supra note 153;
Betsy Pisik, U.S. Budget Plan for U.N. Criticized, WASHINGTON TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2005; Mark Turner, U.N. Risks Severe Financial Crisis Over
Threat to Block Budget, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005; Editorial:
Blocking Reform at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005; U.N. Members
Approve Two-Year Budget, CBS NEWS, Dec. 24, 2005 (read off
<CBSNews.com>).
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the Council. The G77 is also protesting a cost-cutting shrinkage in
Palestinian programs, and provoking showdowns, with the U.N.
Secretariat over administrative reforms and over who will be
Secretary-General Annan’s successor. Annan will establish a Rule
of Law Unit in the Secretariat, and order a review of several G.A.
committees which he thinks have outlived their usefulness and
mandates concerning, e.g., management and the budget of the U.N.
secretariat. He thinks “misunderstandings” led to the G77 charge
that he was engaged in a “grab for power”; it is the U.N. members’
“prerogative to decide what should be cut and what should be
rejected.”156 Annan then accused the G77 of interference in dayto-day Secretariat operations, and of violating the U.N. Charter by
politicizing the Secretariat. The G77 fears that reforms will be
funded by transfers from human rights and development programs.
World Health Organization employees threaten a work stoppage to
protest reorganization plans, despite threats that this will lead to
their being fired.157
In other words, business (or ordinary poker) continues as
usual at the U.N.: the lack of public information and advocacy,
plus the chronic preference for a narrow and short-term selfinterest, leaves almost all of us, including most World Summiteers,
unable to see an admittedly complex “big picture.” This picture
can usefully be defined as the need for active pursuit of Annan’s
interdependent “four pillars” of peace, security, development, and
human rights. Pursuit or non-pursuit of these pillars will affect
almost everyone in the long run, and a failure to recognize and deal
with this fact could reverse the trend toward world civilization. As

156

Thalif Deen, U.N. Chief Denies Making a “Grab for Power”, I.P.S.,
Nov. 22, 2005. Thalif Deen, Developing Nations Fault U.N. Reform
Plan, I.P.S., Nov. 10, 2005; Deen, Move to Shrink Palestinian Programs
Spurs Protest, I.P.S., Nov. 30, 2005; Colum Lynch, Campaigns to
Succeed Annan at U.N. Are Underway, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 26,
2005, A22; U.N. Members Approve, supra note 155.
157
Deen, U.N. Chief, supra note 65 (quoting Annan). See Andrew Jack,
WHO Staff to Stop Work Over Shake-Up, I.P.S., Nov. 30, 2005; Pisik,
supra note 155.
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Tony Blair argued, we need a better understanding of how selfinterest and mutual interest are inextricably linked.158
Improved cooperation, described here as a commitment to
the liberal internationalism rules of a sustained ‘advanced poker’,
enables the players to draw (and bet on) simultaneously self- and
mutually-interested links among development, trade, security,
human rights, environmental protection, migration (a major
concern in the U.S. and E.U.), etc. Hurricane Katrina showed
Americans that cooperation is needed to reduce feelings of job
insecurity and of vulnerability to disaster and violence; and also to
deal with corrupt, fragile and/or incompetent governments. The
poorer the nation, the more likely is a plague of violence which
reinforces poverty and the other evils that operate to deny a human
dignity. Even President Bush spoke of a “moral duty” to recognize
interrelatedness and the need to cooperate (admittedly, to pursue
his anti-terrorism strategy), during his September 2005 speech to
the World Summit. For most other countries, the U.N. is a
necessary, often the most competent, partner for the pursuit of vast,
interrelated responsibilities. This is why World Summit failures on
non-proliferation, human rights, and development, and the partial
successes concerning intervention and administrative reforms, are
so tragic. Peacebuilding is the only genuine Summit success, and
the paucity of useful proposals concerning terrorism and the
composition of the Security Council mean that lack of progress in
these areas is a good thing. The Summit at least offers a starting
point for continued reforms, if members can understand Summit
failures and develop the will to achieve consensus-by-compromise.
As Annan remarks rather optimistically, “reform is a process, not
an event.”159

158

Farley, U.N. Reform, supra note 65; M.S. Haq, President Bush’s
Address at the U.N. Has Made the World’s Poor More Hopeful, THE
[BANGLADESH] NEW NATION, Oct. 2, 2005, 11:37 (an excellent article);
Frederick Studemann, Blair to Call for Global Trade Agreement,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 13, 2005, 22:00; Can Its Credibility Be
Repaired, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2005, at 30. Annan is fond of
“pillars”: cf. his 3 pillars, note 120, supra.
159
Farley, U.N. Reform, supra note 65 (quoting Annan). See Stefania
Bianchi, E.U. Presents its Plan for the Poor, I.P.S., Sept. 21, 2005, 03:23
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REMEDIES?
The once-in-a-generation opportunity for wholesale U.N.
reform160 at the 2005 World Summit having mostly failed, what
are the prospects for piecemeal reforms in the future? The answer
is both “excellent” and “poor.” Governance without a government
creates many outcomes “balanced between no longer and not
yet,”161 and a consensus over smaller changes to this unwieldy
state of affairs is easy to achieve in theory. But there is little basis
for negotiation (game-playing) without a fairly large number of
significant proposals on the table, to trade off against each other.
Otherwise, with relatively little to lose, major players and
coalitions of minor ones, easily manipulate (usually veto) new
negotiated legal orders (rules which require a strong consensus to
take effect), especially by changing the game from ‘advanced’ to
ordinary poker—as has been argued. Reforms are especially
unlikely so long as the world’s hegemonic power (the U.S.)
provokes determined opposition by so easily and regularly setting
international laws aside whenever its short-term interests are
perceived as advanced by such a play. This tactic cannot long
endure within a rational international politics, however: along with
Europeans, the U.S. benefits the most from a stable and
functioning international legal order.162
GMT; Alston, supra note 117, at 826; Holland, supra note __; Kessler,
supra note 23; Mitchell, supra note 75; Ward, Frechette, supra note 47.
160
But see Robert Samuelson, Seduced by ‘Reform”, WASHINGTON
POST, June 2, 2004, A25 (“reform” is “a public relations tool—a
convenient label” slapped on “proposals to claim the high moral
ground.”); id. (self-labeled reformers “aim to stigmatize adversaries as
nasty, wrongheaded, selfish or misinformed.”). These are tactics widely
used at the U.N.
161
LUHMANN, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 17, at 66 (discussing
outcomes from a multiplicity of his “subsystems” which are arguably
like the U.N. “family”—note 1 and accompanying text, supra). See
OBSERVATIONS at 18, 27.
162
Clare Short: Depression and Mistrust Prevail at the U.N., THE
INDEPENDENT, Sept. 16, 2005;
(quoting Clare Short); Coate, supra note 1. See note 70 and
accompanying text, supra (Mark Malloch Brown, on the indispensability
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A useful metaphor for discussing feasible smaller reforms
is based on the Fasces deployed in Republican Rome—and also in
Imperial Rome and Mussolini’s Italy (hence “fascism”), alas. The
Fasces is a bundle of sticks, with each stick representing an aspect
of governance. The sticks are bound together with leather straps
and an axe head is inserted at the top—to represent coercive
capacities. Each member of the U.N. “family” would have a
different Fasces, reflecting the different aspects of governance
they possess, but none of these Fasces have enough of the right
kind of sticks to reflect a government. Apart from the Security
Council’s under circumstances that rarely obtain, the axe heads are
variously small and dull for each U.N. organ, reflecting modest
capacities in the areas of implementation and enforcement. The
point is that particular governance reform sticks, and even better
axe heads, can be added to particular U.N. Fasces without raising
the spectre of a global government, and with little observable
effect on nation-state sovereignty. For most economists, a world
government would create unbearably high agency costs (given a
global heterogeneity of preferences) and enforcement costs. Such
costs would likely negate the welfare gains such a government
would create.
The steady centralization of nation-state power that
followed the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia is now being reversed, as
variously predicted by Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” (1795), Marx’s
“withering away of the state” and Bertrand Russell in the 1060s.
Sovereign equality has always been implausible, and the
Westphalian system of self-help had to be tempered by
(‘advanced’ poker) rules and institutions, to avert disasters as
conflicts grew more deadly over time. National governments
increasingly share power with multinational corporations, other
NGOs, and globalized markets, as well as with international
organizations. Even so, the nation-state remains the only
institution with an automatic right of membership in the world
community—as a “player.” Any theoretical loss of an
increasingly-theoretical sovereignty due to small U.N. reforms is
of reform coalitions). See also Brinkbaumer & Mascolo, supra note 79:
“a morally-oriented international community did not exist before the
Asian tsunami of 2004. {A}fter … three months of solidarity,
everything returned to normal. Id.
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unlikely to be noticed, much less attributed to small U.N.
reforms.163 (Even American neoconservatives are not vigilant in
this regard.)
Smaller reforms can be described as the
constitutionalization of particular practices, to further entrench a
liberal internationalism (or ‘advanced’ poker). There are costs to
forming each constitutional consensus of course, but fundamental
‘game’ changes may make a consensus easier to form. Through
new treaties, modifying old ones, or confidently proclaiming new
customary international laws—an unwritten constitution—the
constitutional goals should be to expand rather than foreclose
opportunities, through broader and more open channels of
communication. Information would then flow more widely to
players and the public, and rapid global changes could be
embodied in legal changes more accurately. Adding escape
clauses judiciously, and new means of buffering widely, would
reduce tensions among the players.164 An excellent article by Joel
Tractman165 explores the most thoroughly-constitutionalized of the
U.N. family, the World Trade Organization. He finds six
constitutional dimensions, which are necessarily interrelated and
related to WTO members’ desires and domestic constitutions: an
economic governance of exchanges of value and authority; an
integration of many (but not all) social values; a political reflection
of the “cultural and democratic integrity of a group”; a legal
definition of the scope of legislative, judicial (I would substitute
dispute resolution), and social interaction processes; a human
rights limitation on nation-state authority; and a redistribution
163

Coate, supra note 1; Peter Drucker, The Global Economy and the
Nation-State, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 1997 (all FOREIGN AFFAIRS
articles are read off <cfr.org>); Jessica Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 1997. See Posner, supra note 8 (while the status quo
will likely prevail, moderate legal revisions are possible); Yoo, supra
note 8 (despite the “almost inviolable” U.N. Charter presumption of state
sovereignty, states must—except in the case of self-defense—delegate
the use of force to the U.N., in “a law enforcement paradigm”). But see
Posner: the collective action problem of decentralized enforcement is
often solved through a self-help.
164
See JACKSON, supra note 19, at 120-21, 216, 350, 355, 445-46, 459.
165
Joel Tractman, The WTO Constitution: Toward Tertiary Rules for
Intertwined Elephants (2005) (S.S.R.N. Paper No. 815764).
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founded on social solidarity.166 I would argue that the
combination of WTO structures and members’ desires operates to
emphasize economic growth at the expense of the functions of
human rights, redistributive/labor, and environmental
constitutions. As reformulated, Tractman’s approach arguably
serves as a (perhaps too complex) template for the further
constitutionalization of other U.N. agencies. Better monitoring
techniques/institutions would reduce collective action problems by
reducing the opportunism of hidden agendas and ploys (i.e.,
cheating at poker). This, plus substantive means for fleshing out
and incentivizing an enlightened, longer-term self-interest, would
enhance the cooperation on which an ‘advanced’ poker depends.
Constitutionalization turns mere voting into an
abandonment of the survival of the fittest, into some value system
which goes beyond a simple welfare (or warfare) maximization by
and for elites. Under pressures on the U.N.—through NGO
“audits” of various agencies and (inevitably partial) mobilizations
of public opinion, but not by the 2005 World Summit that (perhaps
inevitably) left the powerful Security Council in its oligarchic
place—this value system slowly evolves in democratic directions.
Inclusion, participation and, less directly, transparency,
accountability, and distinctive sources of legitimacy, spawn a
growing resistance toward the exclusionary games of ordinary
poker. But democratization is only in its infancy at the WTO, the
IMF, the World Bank, etc. Democratic tendencies do not
necessarily generate respect for minority rights (a weaker form of
self-determination), and democratic tendencies can also generate
unpredictable, incoherent and, as in Serbia, illiberal outcomes.
Despite such potential defects, the popularity as well as the
importance of these artifacts of an international democracy suggest
that, with creativity and courage, the General Assembly could use
them to reclaim its place as the most important U.N. body.
Democratization faces more opposition that does a ‘mere’
constitutionalization, from major players (perhaps excluding the
U.N.) that deem unaccountability and poker-like secrecy as
essential to pursuing their elaborate schemes. For this reason, the
166

Id. Tractman properly treats the WTO as “semi-autonomous”, a
characterization which requires complex analyses of the rest of the U.N.
law and of domestic constitutional orders. Id.
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collectively quite powerful minor players and most NGOs support
democratization as a partial equalizer for the major players’ wealth
and power.167
As mentioned before, the complexity, instability,
uncertainty, and incoherence of much of the international law that
revolves around the U.N. family does not stem from an
international anarchy. Rather, it is characteristic of the governance
without government that has been modeled here as outcomes of
the leaderless, self-organized “ordinary” poker games. The
players’ interest gets exhausted over who wins and who loses what
and when, with little attention being paid to coordination of the
outcomes. Integration of the unwieldy and unevenly-developed
international law rules seems more difficult than a
constitutionalization and even a democratization. Greater
cooperation (more of an ‘advanced’ poker) is essential, and the
World Wide Web offers one model of how this could be
167

Alston, supra note 117, at 790-1; Monique Chemillier-Gendreau,
The Alternative U.N, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2005; Thalif
Deen, U.N.’s Authority Tested By Perils Ahead, IPS, Dec. 27, 2005. See
JACKSON, supra note 19, at 216; LUHMANN, LAW, supra note 17, at 304,
347; WALZER, supra note 33, at 180-81; Alston, at 811 (discussions of
participation which are not tied to a concrete law or policy are, “hollow
and tokenistic”); Ignatius, They’re Not, supra note 37 (quoting the leader
of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood) (the U.S. wants democracy only as an
“artistic decoration”, since truly fair elections would threaten Israeli and
U.S. interests); Adrian Karatnycky, Zigging and Zagging Toward
Democracy, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 15, 2005, at A21 (durable
domestic democracies maintain the discipline of nonviolent civic action
and are led by broadly-based civil coalitions which force splits within the
ruling elite and its security forces); Marincola, Summit Ignores, supra
note 68 (quoting Antonio Papisca) (“It is impossible to speak of
international democracy and democratisation within making reference to
the institutional spheres in which they can actually be pursued.”);
Tractman, supra note 165 (discussing the “democracy deficit” at the
international level); Democracy’s Ten-Year Rut, THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
29, 2005, 39-40 (“Latin Americans do not want to go back to their
dictatorships but they are still unimpressed with their democracies.”); id.
(only 26% feel they “are equal before the law—the same number as in
1998.”); id. (mistrust of political institutions leads Latin Americans
frequently to take to the streets); note 29, supra (collapse of Bush’s
democracy initiative in the Middle East).
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accomplished: relatively few rules which (almost) everyone can
support because they permit diverse content, and few nodes but
many links which can be ‘Googled’ to solve legal disputes and
other problems. John Jackson offers a legal frame for such a
model: “plurilateral” agreements, which integrate an economic
globalization with environmental concerns, for example.168
Agreements could also integrate economic globalization with
human rights, self-determination with other human rights, etc.
With sustained advocacy from NGOs, such agreements could form
the base of a pyramid of international law among the willing, with
increasingly-general integrations emerging at the higher levels of
the pyramid. However, this is open to the criticism that it reverts
to the “a la carte” international law that multilateral agreements are
designed to avoid, and it is thus unlikely that such agreements
would even generate a customary international law. A fuller
integration presumably requires a powerful specialist agency, a
Global Law Organization. Akin to a treaty-based WTO, this GLO
could manage “trade” (and tradeoffs) in law, by integrating the
diverse values created through a decentralized rule-making169, as
well as through constitutionalization, democratization, and new
checks and balances (if any) as well.
Adapted from Montesquieu, checks and balances are an
American and (somewhat) French curb on the powers of
governance, and an alternative to a concentration of powers—the
monarch in Parliament under the British model, for example. It
can be convincingly argued that (almost all) U.N. powers are too
weak to require additional checks and balances that increase the
costs of forming a consensus; things are unlikely to “get out of
hand” in the future. This is because a fair number of informal
checks and balances already exist: means of settling disputes
peaceably; practices that screen out much of the abuse that would
168

See notes ___ and accompanying text, supra.
JACKSON, supra note 19, at 412. See Hirsch, supra note 17; Carlos
Vasquez, Trade Sanctions and Human Rights—Past, Present, and
Future 6 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 797, 831 (___) (agreements could permit but
not require states to impose trade sanctions for human rights violations).
But see Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J.
INT’L. L. 639, 641, 644 (1998).
169
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otherwise occur, through generalized injunctions of cooperation
(conducive to an ‘advanced’ poker); and (modest) restraints on the
use of a naked wealth and power. The most notable check would
be called “federalism”, if government(s) existed at the international
level.170
As ‘players’ wealthy multinational cooperations, other
major NGOs, and nation-states, channel and condition the creation
of international laws through their game-plays. Probably as a
necessary concession to reality, major players can veto many
(game-) initiatives. To the extent that nation-state (and some
NGO) policies are indeed devised democratically, this lends an
indirect democracy to international processes. A few U.N. reforms
spelling out relative competences could reinforce the “subsidiarity”
principle that aids in the management of complexity: assign a task
to the lowest level of governance that can most efficiently and
humanely perform it, given that governance level’s degree of
development. International action should thus be, and largely is,
reserved for those things where various levels of the relevant
nation-states cannot or will not act: “externalities”, where these
states are concerned. Some of these externalities could be tamed
by restraining the White House, if possible and necessary, and by a
Global Law Organization (supra) which eliminates multiple legal
overlaps. To the extent that the distinction can be drawn, the
politics of these externalities is for the members, and the
administration (the monitoring, implementation, and enforcement
of political decisions) is for the U.N. family that has often avoided
accountability for its actions in the past. The most sensitive topics
here are empowering poor people and creating an (inevitably
modest) redistribution on their behalf, especially in developing
countries and where the plight of the poor is generated by the
global markets beyond the control of most nation-states.171
170

Tractman, supra note 165. See id. (something like the GLO I
propose could watch for imbalances among values within particular U.N.
agencies, and seek to impose “redistribution” and human rights norms as
expressions of social solidarity and as advancing a new international
civilization). On poker game outcomes as the kind of “noise” that can
lead to institutional formation or reformation, see TURNER, supra note
106, at 103, 127, 137-39, 146-47, 153.
171
See JACKSON, supra note 19, at 454.
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The monitoring, implementation, and the more centralized
(based less on a self-help) enforcement of international political
decisions require the displacement of governance through
‘advanced’ as well as ordinary poker games, by an
institutionalization which is an extrapolation from the
constitutionalization discussed earlier. Many U.N. institutions are
thin, unbalanced, and thus incapable of promoting “thicker” human
rights and developmental rights and duties, as well as promoting
legality and justice generally—as solutions to collective action
problems.172 Discussing the reasons why customary international
humanitarian laws are violated, Abdul Korama describes a mixture
of factors: the rules are unknown, known but inadequate,
enforcement mechanisms are weak, and law is simply
disregarded.173 These are the factors that reformed and thus
stronger institutions must work on to reduce the number and
seriousness of violations.
Pursuing a piecemeal reform process such as described
here, we must learn to live with legal and political failures—as we
describe them—and expect only small legal evolutions. We have
to ask the right questions, use hard-headed analysis rather than a
“happy-think”, and take quick advantage of transcendent and
incremental opportunities. Above all, we should recognize that
much of what we see as necessary or natural is really a matter of
choice or context. For example, dignitary human rights mean
different things in different circumstances, and the seeminglyunattainable Millennium Development Goals may merely give
false hope, ignore the effects of the global distribution of wealth
172

See id. at 275, 411-12, 423; Evans, supra note 48, at 1056;
Tractman, supra note 165. But see Evans, at 1062 (calling global
“market discipline” a “counter-law” which, I would argue, is
nevertheless conditioned heavily by the WTO/IMF/World Bank legal
complex). But see also Alston, supra note 117, at 791 (decentralization
is required to “enhance poor people’s voice”); Glennon, supra note 19
(“To reduce state miscreance it is necessary to reduce state power;
countervailing (decent-concerns such as humanitarianism and state
security are simply irrelevant.”).
173
See Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, The Alternative U.N., LE
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2005; Brown & Benn, supra note 92;
Godoy, supra note 66; Posner, supra note 8. Abdul Korama, Forward,
in Henckaerts & Oswald-Beck, supra note ___, at xii.
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and power, be too selective, not go far enough, fail to attract a
sufficient legitimacy to be implemented, etc.
CONCLUSION
This article is no less complex that the global phenomena it
tries to describe, phenomena of an insiders’ game—like poker.
Rather than try to summarize these phenomena here, we should
close with brief thoughts about the future. After the 2005 World
Summit, “many critics wrote the United Nations off as an
institution so deeply flawed that it was beyond salvation.”174 This
article takes a different, more nuanced view: despite political (or
poker-playing) flaws, a creaking bureaucracy, and inadequate
resources, the U.N. will play a rather uncertain yet critical role in
solving global externalities/collective action problems—especially
if piecemeal reforms are aggressively pursued. Discussing
international economic law while paraphrasing Heraclites, Andreas
Lowenfeld argues that “nothing is permanent except change”175,
and that most international law of the U.N. is followed most of the
time.176 Philip Alston is right to worry that the “U.N. approach of
indivisibility” will become a “tautology”177 or perhaps a cliché, yet
it currently offers a “big picture” with which to confront nationstate players busy totaling up their poker winnings and losses.
Will the U.N. create a “networked world? A Global
Neighborhood Watch? Managed Globalization?” Are there other
facets “to think about and support an integrated response” from
voters and policymakers?178 Through reform, will the U.N. family
slowly create freedoms from want and fear, and otherwise preserve
our common humanity? Can new collaborative arrangements
174

Alston, supra note 117, at 762-65; Glennon, supra note 19; Paul &
Nahory, supra note 85.
175
Andrew Mack, Peace on Earth? Increasingly, Yes, WASHINGTON
POST, Dec. 28, 2005, A21.
176
ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 43 (____).
See Lederer, Global Violence, supra note 54; LOWENFELD, supra note
__, at 148.
177
Alston, supra note 117, at 784-85.
178
Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Shadow World, WASHINGTON POST,
Oct. 30, 2005, BW6 (reviewing MOISS NAM, ILLICIT: HOW SMUGGLERS,
TRAFFICKERS, AND COPYCATS ARE HIJACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY).
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make better use of everybody’s expertise, and of our other
resources, in discovering new opportunities and addressing new
threats?179 Some or all of these futures are plausible, but one thing
is clear: to change the U.N., “we must change too.”180 The most
important and difficult change is to stiffen political will at the
nation-state level, to resist the temptation to create law through an
ordinary poker—in pursuit of unstable, short-term, and sometimesmisperceived gains—by decreasing the incentives so to defect
from ‘advanced’ poker—where incentives must be increased.181
APPENDIX: THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND
TARGETS (Alston, supra note ___, at 828-29).
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
• Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of
people whose income is less than one dollar a day.
•

179

Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of
people who suffer from hunger.

Romulo, supra note __. See Alston, supra note 117, at 772 (quoting
Christian Tormuschat): “If human life and dignity are not protected, the
idea of a legal order would collapse” —at least in the liberal tradition.
Law-as-ordinary-poker is thus dangerous because it is not biased toward
dignity-enhancing outcomes.
180
Thoroor, supra note ___.
181
One aspect of law-as-poker is the effect it may have on ethnic or
religious identity. Law-as-poker may accelerate the obsolescence of a
variety of ‘traditional’ practices, while paying lip-service to diversity,
and may render discourse over law—based on John Rawls’s
“overlapping consensus” for example—as cheap game-bets no one
listens to because legal content does not matter much. See JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (___) (“overlapping consensus”). Sticking your
national neck out by assuming a human rights obligation, for example, is
often seen as, and sometimes is, a game-bet denoted to winning
something quite different. But see Alston, at 809. To give Kofi Annan
the last word: “We must find what President Franklin Roosevelt once
called ‘the courage to fulfill our roles in an admittedly imperfect world.’”
Kathryn Horvat and Pat Shea, The United Nations, 60 Years and Still
Counting, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 26, 2005.
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Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education
•

Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys
and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of
primary schooling.

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women
•

Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and
secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels
of education no later than 2015.

Goal 4: Reduce child mortality
•

Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015,
the under-five mortality rate.

Goal 5: Improve maternal health
•

Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and
2015, the maternal morality ratio.

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
•

Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the
spread of HIV/AIDS.

•

Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the
incidence of malaria and other major diseases.

Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
•

Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable
development into country policies and programmes and
reverse the loss of environmental resources.

•

Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people
without sustainable access to safe drinking water.
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•

Target 11: By 2020, to have achieved a significant
improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum
dwellers.
Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development
Some of the indicators listed below will be monitored separately
for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked
countries and small island developing States.
•

Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based,
predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial
system.

•

Target 13: Address the Special Needs of the Least
Developed Countries.

•

Target 14: Address the Special Needs of landlocked
countries and small island developing states.

•

Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of
developing countries through national and international
measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long
term.

•

Target 16: In co-operation with developing countries,
develop and implement strategies for decent and productive
work for youth.

•

Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies,
provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing
countries.

•

Target 18: In co-operation with the private sector, make
available the benefits of new technologies, especially
information and communications.

